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Key Terms  
Manichean: the dualistic perspective of one side versus the other, a definite separation 
of identity as ‘good’ or ‘evil’ 
Threat Inflation: “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond 
the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify”1 
Individualism: The idealistic American principle which relies on the idea that America 
and its people must preserve their independent, democratic, and capitalistic culture 
above all else. 
Framing: The use of specific terms, visual elements, or other agenda setting ways in 
which the media contextualizes a subject or topic. 
East: The Eastern Bloc, all countries influenced by Russian government and culture 
during the years 1950-53. 
West: Specifically the U.S. and its democratic allies post WWII (Britain, Germany, etc.) 
Early Cold War: 1950-54 
Cold War Era: 1947-1991 
Post 9/11 era: 2001-2004 
The Marketplace of Ideas: The marketplace of ideas theory stands for the notion that, 
with minimal government intervention—a laissez faire approach to the regulation of 
speech and expression—ideas, theories, propositions, and movements will succeed or 
fail on their own merits.2
                                                        
1 Thrall, A. Trevor., and Jane K. Cramer. American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat 
Inflation since 9/11. London: Routledge, 2009. 1.  
2Pinaire, Brian K. "Marketplace of Ideas Theory." Civil Liberties. June 26, 2014. 
http%3A%2F%2Fuscivilliberties.org%2F. 
  
  
Introduction 
 In researching the links between threat inflation and the persistence of 
manichean rhetoric in the portrayal of foreign policy conflicts abroad, the similarities 
between the U.S.’s responses to the Soviet threat during Cold War and the U.S. 
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the early 2000s are uncanny. At one point in my 
initial research, I used a speech given by President Reagan at the end of the Cold War 
and G.W. Bush’s initial 9/11 address and rewrote them to fit the context of the other 
time period. I found the ease with which the rhetoric and language fit unsettling. As I 
continued to see similar aspects of rhetoric portrayed by both politicians and the media 
in the two separate periods, I began to wonder why a time so notorious as the Cold War 
for violating civil liberties was so incredibly similar to the recent 9/11 era, specifically 
in regards to the subsequent Iraq War?  
Yes, these manichean frames and rhetoric clearly persisted, but why had they 
persisted? The obviously similarities that came to mind were that like the Cold War, the 
geopolitical parameters of the Iraq War were hard to define both at home and abroad. 
And yes, in both eras, popular media and the government encouraged American citizens 
to be wary of threats on home soil. But on another level, were elites manipulating the 
media and thus public opinion in both eras, or did public opinion simply reinforce 
beliefs of the elites as they were projected in the media? My approach was to focus on 
this variety of questions, keeping in mind specifically manichean rhetoric and framing, 
and delve into research that dealt with the first few years of the Cold War and the years 
leading up to the Iraq War. 
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As my research continued, I found that in both time periods, media framing of 
the individual enemy was directly linked to the rhetoric of elites, specifically the 
President. In addition, each brief time period could be broken down into fairly parallel 
chronologies. First and foremost, each time period had at least a prior decade of 
dualistic, good versus evil rhetoric in use by both media and the elites to frame 
international conflicts and to identify characteristics of the threat or enemy at hand. For 
example, during WWII this us versus them language was used in propaganda against 
Germany and in the 1990s, Presidents Bush and Clinton both used words like “evil” to 
describe Saddam Hussein and other terrorist groups. Next, I was able to find specific 
catalysts for subsequent militarization in response to conflicts of the Cold War and the 
9/11 attacks; for the Cold War, it was the 1947 Truman Containment speech, whereas 
for the Iraq War it was 9/11 and Bush’s immediate response. The next part of my 
examination into each time period dealt with the construction of a national narrative. 
More specifically, I analyzed how news media and journalists drew upon these elite 
responses and adopted the rhetoric of each President in terms of media depiction of 
historical events and the framing of the enemy. Ultimately, the next step was an analysis 
of the interaction of the two, historically distant national narratives as they had been 
established by historical context, Presidential influences, and media dissemination of 
administration ideas within the American democratic marketplace of ideas. 
What I found throughout my research was not just that the press and the 
presidency mutually played a role in establishing the national narratives of both the 
Cold War and the post-9/11 era, but that they were mutually beneficial in a way that 
resulted in the overall failure of the marketplace of ideas. Concerns over social and 
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financial sustainability present for both politicians and media outlets ultimately resulted 
in this failure. Fears of being labeled “unpatriotic,” of losing traction with constituents, 
and decreased viewership all contributed to the large absence of credible, popular 
dissenting opinions and criticism from both the “fourth estate” and elites. The final 
section of this thesis discusses conclusions based on a variety of evidence from other 
researchers, scholars, news archives, and media outlets on the topic. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
4  
Chapter 1: The Early Cold War Years 
I. Post World War II and the Official Start of the Cold War 
A. Brief Historical Context  
It is important to note the implications of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the 
1941 Atlantic Conference and Charter between Great Britain’s Prime Minister Churchill 
and the United States’ President Roosevelt, and Russia’s acts of noncompliance 
following the termination of WWII.  
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 “launched an international movement of 
revolutionary parties.”3 During the revolution, the Communist Party denounced 
capitalism and imperialism, rather than espousing centralized, authoritarian 
government.4 During the second World War, the Ally’s need for Stalin’s manpower 
coupled with the weakening state of Germany led to the expansion of Soviet Russia’s 
control over Eastern Europe.5 At the end of WWII, the U.S. also found itself not only a 
top world power but much more economically and politically sound than its allies. 
Russia too was gaining power and their beliefs almost inherently contradicted those of 
the U.S. Thus, when efforts came to revitalize a war-torn Europe, Soviet Russia and 
American policies were almost completely misaligned. 
Flash back to 1941, in the midst of WWII— the Atlantic Conference and 
Charter. One of the main goals of this conference was to convince Americans to enter 
                                                        
3 Whitcomb, Roger S. "Containment: Misreading Soviet Russia." Global Dialogue, 1st ser., 3, no. 4 
(November 2001): 59-79. http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/57385907/containment-misreading-
soviet-russia. 
4Whitcomb, "Containment: Misreading Soviet Russia,” 59-79. 
5Whitcomb, "Containment: Misreading Soviet Russia,” 59-79. 
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into WWII and or to further support the British war effort.6 Although the conference did 
not accomplish either of these aims, Churchill and Roosevelt did outline eight shared 
principles each country would follow after the end of the war. Particularly important 
was the commitment to the  “restoration of self-governments for all countries that had 
been occupied during the war and allowing all peoples to choose their own form of 
government.”7 
Then, between 1945 and 1947, a variety of events contributed to mounting 
tensions between the two superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Russia. In 1945, Stalin 
promised to allow democratic elections in Poland. Yet, even after meeting with an 
American representative sent to ensure compliance, Russia continued to prohibit full 
democratic elections in a number of Eastern European countries.8 Another such conflict 
occurred in 1946, when Russia ignored the Treaty of 1942 made between the Allies and 
Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza Palahvi to remove troops from Iran 6 months after the 
war’s end.9 The Middle Eastern country had been a strategic holding ground for the 
Allies during the war. Rather than evacuate troops as Britain and the U.S. did, Russia 
instead sponsored multiple Communist revolutions within the country in order to gain 
some control over their Iranian neighbors and their resources.10 The Iranian government 
                                                        
6"The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941 - 1937–1945 - Milestones - Office of the Historian." US 
Department of State: Office of the Historian. November 8, 2013. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf. 
7  "The Atlantic Conference & Charter, 1941 - 1937–1945 - Milestones - Office of the Historian." 
8Bostdorff, Denise M. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. College Station: 
Texas A & M University Press, 2008. 12. 
9Erkan, Suleyman. "The Invasion of Iran by the Allies in WWII." Facultatea De Istorie și Geografie-
Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon. February 11, 2014. 
http://atlas.usv.ro/www/codru_net/CC16/2/iran.pdf. 17. 
10 Erkan, Suleyman. "The Invasion of Iran by the Allies in WWII.” 122. 
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sought assistance from the U.S. and Britain, thus initiating the 1946 Iran Crisis and 
solidifying growing conflict between the East and the West.11  
B. The Cold War Begins-Pivotal Speeches of 1946-1947   
Three crucial speeches by Stalin, Churchill and Truman in 1946 and 1947 
reflected the mounting global tensions between two main ideologies: Communism and 
Democracy.  Together, these political statements would establish a rhetorical precedent, 
the foundation of a national narrative and international policy agendas throughout the 
Cold War. Although each of these speeches by world leaders sought to define their own 
country’s principles in contrast to the principles of the other, what they really did was to 
give immense insight into how each of these countries saw the post-war world, and 
perspective into its individual identification of the declared enemy. In his analysis of 
Stalin’s election eve “Two Camps” speech, Stefan Schwarzkopf of the Copenhagen 
Business School concluded that in creating “the allegory of the other,” Stalin, “did not 
reflect contemporary reality, but exposed its creators’ perceptions of the postwar 
climate.”12 Through an examination of all three speeches, it becomes clear that 
Schwarzkopf’s analysis holds true for each individual leader.  
i. Stalin’s 1946 “Two Camps” Speech  
In February of 1946, the first of the aforementioned speeches, Stalin’s “Two 
Camps” speech was given on the eve of Soviet elections. Stalin immediately sets the 
tone of the speech by blaming capitalism for the devastation of WWII, saying the war                                                         
11 Erkan, Suleyman. "The Invasion of Iran by the Allies in WWII.” 122. 
12Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies. Edited by Annette 
Vowinckel and Marcus M. Payk. By Thomas Lindenberger. Oxford, New York: Berghan Books, 2012. 
223. 
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was “…in reality as the inevitable result of the development of the world economic and 
political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism.”13 He elaborates, saying that due to 
the uneven development and distribution of resources, “the capitalist world is sent into 
two hostile camps and war follows…Thus, as a result of the first crisis in the 
development of the capitalist world economy, the First World War arose, The Second 
World War arose as a result of the second crisis....”14 He declares that the WWII victory 
is a testament to the validity of the Communist lifestyle, saying “The Red Army 
heroically withstood all the adversities of the war, routed completely the armies of our 
enemies and emerged victoriously from the war.” He concludes with a 5-year plan of 
Soviet restoration and the mention of increasing scientific research.  
Although translations vary and do not hold the same powerful effect in this 
language as they do in their original, there are a few themes in Stalin’s speech which 
make it worth analyzing further. At the start, he uses the term comrade to address his 
constituents, setting a tone of camaraderie and respect for his audience. He 
acknowledges the devastation of the recent wars and names Germany and Japan as the 
aggressors. From there, Stalin clarifies the facts as he sees them—namely claiming the 
role of capitalism in triggering WWI, a common musing in Marxist theory.15 He 
presents his evidence, citing observations of scarce world resources fought over by a 
variety of countries seeking control of these resources. This piece of evidence is 
irrefutable—but he frames it as a capitalist, rather than universal problem. In fact he                                                         
13"Message From Stalin to Truman, April 24, 1945 & Stalin's Election Speech, February 9,1946." 
Http://history.jburroughs.org, March 8, 2011. 
http://history.jburroughs.org/cfront/us45/readings/stalin.htm. 
14"Message From Stalin to Truman, April 24, 1945 & Stalin's Election Speech, February 9,1946." 
15Thompson, Nicholas. The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold 
War. New York: Henry Holt, 2009. 55. 
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continues on to say that the war could have been avoided if a Communist doctrine had 
been employed by the conflicting nations, once again appealing to his supporters and 
reinforcing the success of the state. Stalin provides similar evidence for the reasons 
behind WWII and once again frames the conflicts leading up to the war as direct results 
of capitalism. 
The next evidence, namely struggles which Stalin’s peoples endured during the 
wars, is justified he says by their victory. In fact, this victory proves the undeniable 
success of the socialist lifestyle, Stalin says. Once again, he frames the state’s 
ideologies and followers as triumphant and blameless in the recent conflicts. He has 
clearly stated his opposition to the faults and doctrines of capitalist countries without 
acknowledging their role in winning the war. He received a standing ovation from the 
audience, a clear indication of their support. 
In this speech, Stalin attempts to explain the world wars by blaming former 
allies with opposing ideologies—thus transitioning them into the role of an enemy. 
Lauding Socialism as successful and unifying, while denouncing capitalism as a 
divisive doctrine, Stalin is able to separate the two in manichean terms. With this 
rhetoric he effectively denounces capitalist countries as allies and instead equates them 
to war, while equating the Soviet system with peace. It is in this way that Stalin uses 
this election speech to frame the immediate past and present as, ironically, a manichean 
struggle.  
However, this message is ironically compounded with the chronology of the 
steps leading up to the current, successful state Stalin says the Soviet Union is in. As 
Thompson says, the message of Stalin’s Two Camps speech “was clear: war was the 
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locomotive of history.”16 According to his foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotv, Stalin 
maintained that “the First World War pulled one country out of capitalist slavery. The 
Second World War created a socialist system, the third will put an end to imperialism 
once and for all.”17 Even more contrary to his message that the Socialist system brings 
peace, at the end of his speech Stalin hints at further scientific research to “outstrip the 
achievements of science beyond the borders of our country,” intimating to many 
outsiders a Soviet plan for the development of arms concurrent with that of the U.S.’s 
atomic bomb.  
 Ultimately, however, this speech’s importance lies in outside interpretations. 
American and British perceptions of the “Two Camps” speech further intensified the 
complexities of events and decisions leading up to the commencement of the Cold War. 
President Truman, for example, saw this speech as merely  “an address directed at an 
internal audience purely for political purposes.”18 Many westerners, including many 
members of the Truman administration, took much of Stalin’s speech as a major threat, 
however.  
These fears and varying interpretations led to the well-known telegram from 
George Kennan at the Moscow Embassy, which envisioned the Soviet doctrine as a 
monumental threat to U.S. national security. 19 Kennan, who spent much of his life and 
the war in Soviet countries, sent the State Department a lengthy telegram based on his 
own personal analysis of Russia and the Kremlin. Although for many years there was 
little evidence to support the fact that President Truman ever read the telegram, his                                                         
16Thompson. The Hawk and the Dove. 55. 
17Thompson. The Hawk and the Dove. 55. 
18Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 19. 
19Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 20-21. 
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Secretary of State James F. Byrnes called it a “splendid analysis.”20 The telegram 
basically outlined Moscow as a militant entity with the ultimate goal of undermining the 
U.S. in any way possible.21 At the end, Kennan “offered a solution for combating the 
Soviet threat, concluding with a vague call for national unity and moral uplift.”22 
According to Thompson, the real power of Kennan’s telegram lay in its timing. Conflict 
with Communist influences in the Middle East were escalating and, just two weeks 
later, Winston Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech added another layer of opposition 
and bolstered adversarial U.S. sentiments towards Stalin and Soviet aggression. 
ii. Churchill’s 1946 “Sinews of Peace” or “Iron Curtain” speech 
On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered his Sinews of Peace (or Iron 
Curtain) speech at a Missouri college. He lauded the current political power of the U.S. 
and contrasted it with the dark imagery of an “Iron Curtain” separating the liberated 
west with the currently under attack east. He emphasized that the once-small 
Communist factions in various countries were flaring up, as shown by the Iran Crisis 
and general unrest in Turkey. These revolutionaries caused angst amongst citizens, 
prevented free elections and threatened the recent peace achieved.23 Ultimately, 
Churchill asked the American people to adhere to the principles set forth by the UN 
Charter and warned them of aggressions from Soviet Russia.  
                                                        
20 Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 22. 
21 Thompson. The Hawk and the Dove. 60. 
22 Thompson. The Hawk and the Dove. 60. 
23 "The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." The Churchill Centre. Accessed May 09, 2015. 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace. 
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During his speech Churchill says that “ two giant marauders” face the security 
of the U.S. at home: war and tyranny.24 He emphasizes the urgency and immediacy of 
these two threats by framing them in terms of their recent effects on Europe, namely the 
physical destruction and poverty caused by each of the World Wars. This urgent tone is 
especially present when Churchill compares the post-war world to that of Germany 
before WWII, saying: “Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own fellow-
countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention….We surely must not let 
that happen again. This can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good 
understanding on all points with Russia…”25 This comparison serves to reinforce the 
fear of that which threatens stability and newfound peace, and identifies that threat as 
the Soviet Union and its Communist ideologies. To prevent war from recurring, 
Churchill calls for “the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples.”26 By 
identifying Britain and the U.S. in terms of their main commonality, language, he 
emphasizes to his audience the special bond between the two allies. He continues to 
explain that such a partnership provides “mutual security,” something threatened by the 
two “marauders.”27 
 It isn’t until about halfway into his speech that Churchill brings up the ominous 
“shadow” which “has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory.”28 
Then, like Stalin, Churchill takes the time “to state the facts as I see them to you, to 
place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.”29 These facts are,                                                         
24"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
25"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
26 "The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
27"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
28"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
29"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
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according to Churchill, aggressive Soviet policies which “are seeking everywhere to 
obtain totalitarian control ”30 over Germany, various Eastern states, and the Middle 
East. He famously declares “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent,” 
effectively using imagery to divide the continent into one dark, imprisoned Eastern 
region juxtaposed with a celebrated and victorious West. The dark forces don’t stop 
there according to Churchill; they are present worldwide. 
  More than once does Churchill associates Britain and the U.S. with high 
morality. If the two countries unite “in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in 
science and in industry, and in moral force,” then the global balance of power will 
remain. In another instance, Churchill emphasizes another commonality between the 
two: religion. He says, “Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United 
States…the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and 
peril to Christian civilisation.” Note the identification of British and American societies 
collectively as ‘Christian civilisation,’ aligning the countries with accepted moral values 
over the threatening, Communist forces.  
 Interestingly enough Churchill uses adjectives like “friends” and “valiant” to 
describe Stalin and the Russian people, juxtaposed with his facts stating Soviet 
militancy and noncompliance with peace terms. He acknowledges them as one of the 
“leading nations of the world” whose power must be checked in order to prevent the 
termination of recently achieved peace. Perhaps this friendly word choice was meant to 
appeal to American ambivalence regarding Britain’s plea to join forces against their 
former Soviet allies, but to no avail. According to Wooster College’s Department Chair                                                         
30"The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech")." 
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and Professor Dr. Denise Bostdorff, author of Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The 
Cold War Call to Arms, despite mixed reviews of Churchill’s speech in the media and 
Congress, “public opinion appeared overwhelmingly against Churchill’s proposition 
and against the president’s apparent approval of it.”31 President Truman would remain 
silent on the matter for almost exactly another year. 
iii. Truman’s 1947 “Truman Doctrine” speech   
 Both Stalin and Churchill’s speeches occurred nearly on top of one another; 
however, Truman’s response to perceived threats would remain largely internal until the 
famed Truman Doctrine Speech given March 12, 1947. In the midst of recovery, a civil 
war had broken out in Greece between communist factions (called the Democratic 
Army) and the national government following corrupt elections in 1946. Refusing to 
become directly involved in the conflict, the American government was continuously 
entreated by Britain to help maintain democracy in the Greek state so as to keep a 
balance of democratic and communist powers worldwide.32 In the week leading up to 
his special address to Congress on sending aid to Greece and Turkey, news outlets 
provided important context for the speech. A Newsweek editorial declared that losing 
Greece to Communism would give Russia control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Both 
the New York Times and ABC radio host Earl Godwin encouraged audiences that it was 
time for the U.S. to act in defense of the West.33 The American people had yet to be 
persuaded, however. 
                                                        
31 Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 26. 
32 Leonard, Kelsey. "The Greek Civil War." Cold War Museum. August 20, 2008. 
http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/GreekCivilWar1945-1949.asp. 
33 Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 10. 
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 According to Bostdorff, “Truman’s address articulated a new policy—The 
Truman Doctrine—and marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy…”34 In fact, this 
speech marks what many historians today say was the real beginning of the Cold War. 
In terms of media, this speech was extremely important because it gave various news 
outlets an identifiable threat—Communism and Soviet Russia.  
 His word choice frames the Greek situation in manichean terms. For example, 
early in the speech he identifies Communism with terrorism and chaos: “The very 
existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several 
thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority…”35 
Shortly thereafter, he states that “Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-
supporting and self-respecting democracy,” and continues on to say, “The United States 
must supply this assistance.”36 By framing the Communist-led revolutions as defying 
“the government’s authority” and declaring that, “there is no other country to which 
democratic Greece can turn,”37 Truman turns an instance of geographically removed 
political conflict into a battle between sanctioned democratic governments and 
terrorizing dissidents, further creating a manichean situation in which the U.S. and its 
democratic system is the savior. 
 Later in the speech Truman depicts U.S. intervention in Greece and Turkey in 
terms of broader policy goals. In fact, Truman departs from pre-World War American 
isolationist policy. Instead he develops a declaration founded on the “fundamental issue 
                                                        
34Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 12. 
35Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 2. 
36Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 3. 
37Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 2-3. 
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in the war with Germany and Japan,”38 an issue which was solved through victory over 
“countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other 
nations.”39 In line with the goals of the UN, President Truman asserts that, “One of the 
primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of 
conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free 
from coercion.”40 
  The rhetoric used in the speech clearly defined the threat to Turkey and Greece 
in manichean terms. Initially, Truman says the militant minority threatening Greece is 
led by Communists; however, that is the first and only time he mentions the party—and 
Russia is not mentioned at all.. And yet, Truman continues to describe aggressors along 
Greece’s frontier, namely the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, as well as 
violations of the Yalta agreement in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria—all countries 
under the influence of Soviet Russia. Rather than outright blaming Soviet reign, Truman 
instead refers to the perpetrators of dissidence as “totalitarian regimes”41 (used at least 4 
times) and an “armed minority”42 (used at least 3 times). Although from the outset it is 
clear to whom the West attributes these threats to democracy, the titles and descriptors 
Truman uses to identify these peoples again frame them as the enemy, in very dualistic 
terms. 
 In fact, Truman’s speech ultimately poses Communism and its ideology as the 
antithesis of the U.S. and its principles. Truman presents both the U.S. and the militant 
                                                        
38Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 4. 
39Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 4. 
40Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 4. 
41 Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 5,7. 
42Bostdorff. Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms. 2, 5-6. 
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minority against each other, clearly stating that “every nation must choose between 
alternative ways of life.”43 From this perspective, there is no middle ground between the 
two, faintly reminiscent of Stalin’s “Two Camps” speech.  
 This first way of life he says: “is based upon the will of the majority, and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees 
of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression.”44 Although he does not specify this lifestyle as ‘American’, these are 
ultimately all facets of the Constitution and principles of American democracy. The 
alternative lifestyle supported by these minorities is “forcibly imposed upon the 
majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.” Throughout his speech Truman 
uses words like “coercion” in juxtaposition with American ideals of “freedom,” framing 
the political unrest in Turkey and Greece as more than an internal issue. Rather, he puts 
the conflict in terms of the bigger picture, as a crisis threatening national and 
international peace. At the close of his speech, Truman plainly presents U.S. 
involvement in Turkey and Greece’s issues in terms of extreme dualism: 
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and 
grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of 
a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the 
world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our 
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leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the 
welfare of this Nation.45 
All of the rhetoric and the themes of this speech convey one common message: urgency 
in the face of a crisis. Whether or not this crisis was occurring on American soil, the 
deliberateness of Truman’s language certainly evokes that exact sentiment. The speech 
is largely in the present and present perfect, evoking a definite sense of urgency even 
though the conflict is geographically far-removed from the U.S. Truman frames the 
conflict in vague, dualistic terms, pitting this overseas issue as a broader struggle 
between good and evil, democracy and totalitarianism—all playing on the fears of a 
congress and constituency still recovering from two major World Wars, and using the 
same, familiar rhetoric to persuade his audience.  
 iv. Concluding Analysis of Speeches 
 All three of these speeches are not solely important from a governmental or 
public policy standpoint. Each of these speeches, two of which were delivered in the 
U.S. to American citizens, played an immense role in shaping media outlooks at the 
beginning of the Cold War. The complexity of events following WWII was 
compounded by the multitude of interpretations of each event, those events being 
Communist support of revolutionaries in Middle Eastern countries and Soviet 
noncompliance with U.N. peace treaty terms. Each of these three speeches can be seen 
as an attempt by each world leader to define their country’s global role in an expanding 
international community.. According to Bostdorff, the rhetoric of Churchill, Kennan, 
and other politicians “shaped an increasingly narrow interpretive framework through                                                         
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which [U.S.] administration officials viewed Soviet behavior.”46  The dualistic 
depictions of East and West, as declared by Stalin and Churchill, set the stage for 
imminent conflict and, more importantly, set the tone for Truman’s speech—the speech 
which is the historically acknowledged start of the Cold War. 
 There were many factors that went into Truman’s decision to engage and he 
outlines most of them in his speech. For example, faced with the knowledge that there 
was a distinct possibility of a third war, along with foreign and domestic political 
pressures, pressure from media outlets to make a statement, and facing the newer 
challenge of adhering to the UN’s charter for global peace, Truman reacted. One of his 
self-admitted greatest fears was that of a domino effect regarding political upheaval in 
Greece and Turkey. Truman said “Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this 
fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.” He went 
even further to say, “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining 
their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the 
world—and we shall sure endanger the welfare of this Nation.”  
 Although the president sought to reconcile the UN framework and mutual 
principles of the Atlantic Conference, Soviet actions were continuously deemed 
adversarial to each aforementioned charter. Compounded by the staunch manichean 
identities of each country set forth initially by Stalin and Churchill, continued actions by 
the Soviets ultimately forced Truman’s hand to engage in alliance with Britain. The 
extremely dualistic framing of each country and its goals within these three speeches 
leaves no room for a middle ground, according to each speaker.                                                         
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 Thus, using the principles of the UN and the ideology of American democracy, 
Truman forged a new era of foreign policy doctrine saying, “I believe that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist 
free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.” It is this 
uncompromising rhetoric that would mark media interpretations and U.S. foreign policy 
during the early years of the Cold War, and beyond.  
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II. Media constructs the narrative 
 One of the most crucial ways in which media affects public opinion is through 
the intersection of cultural media and government. Although examinations of media 
may not always give concrete causal evidence for cultural behaviors, as Dr. Marcus 
Payk said: “…one can read media products as both the expression and the 
representation of cultural constellations in shifting historical contexts.”47 At the end of 
WWII, American society was experiencing radical shifts in politics, culture, and 
technology. By analyzing some of the popular media and their messages as Americans 
shifted into the atmosphere of the Cold War it is possible to identify some of the key 
paradigms that would persistently influence the American psyche well into the decades 
to come. 
A. Hollywood’s roots in propaganda  
 A well-known component of the foundations of 20th century media was the use 
of propaganda during the first and second World Wars.  As Elmer Davis, director of the 
Office of War Information (OWI) said, “The easiest way to inject a propaganda idea 
into most people’s minds is to let it go in through the medium of an entertainment 
picture when they do not realize that they are being propagandized.”48 Let’s begin 
before the end of WWII—1942, the founding of the OWI. According to Koppe and 
Black, the OWI “was an organization designed to not only disseminate information and 
to clarify issues but also to arouse support for particular symbols and ideas.”49 Founded 
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by an executive order in June of 1942, the OWI was a consolidation of a variety of pre-
war information groups, such as the office’s predecessor the Office of Government 
Reports (OGR) and the Bureau of Motion Pictures (BMP).50 It is with the BMP and 
government interference in the late wartime film industry that our story begins. 
 As one of the most influential industries in the world, Hollywood produced 
almost 500 films annually during WWII and reached eighty million foreign audience 
members, making it more impactful than any other medium.51 Up until OWI’s 
founding, the film industry had actually “avoided ‘message films’ in favor of romances, 
musicals, murder mysteries, and westerns—‘pure entertainment’ in Hollywood 
parlance.”52 Knowing the power of the medium, following the establishment of the 
OWI, in 1942 Nelson Poynter was appointed as a liaison between government and the 
film industry. At that time, Hollywood had “in consideration or under production 213 
films” related to the war effort.53  
 Of these 213 movies, Poynter and the OWI found that 40 percent “focused on 
the armed forces” and “less than 20 percent dealt with the enemy.”54 Rather than 
contextualizing or interpreting real elements of the war, OWI found that a majority of 
these films simply used the war as plot theme. Realizing this, Poynter and the OWI 
released the “Manual for the Motion Picture Industry.”55 This manual lauded the United 
States and it’s way of life, naming democracy and civil rights progress as facets of U.S. 
life which would be demolished if the fascist enemy won WWII. Although the film                                                         
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industry was one of the least censored during the war, the Bureau of Motion Pictures 
(BMP) worked to review scripts and became involved in production as much as 
possible in order to influence film content. An example of this influence can be seen in 
RKO’s film, Bombardiers. While the film initially focused on a pacifist-thinking 
bombardier, OWI recommended a revision which changed the focus to the idea of a 
‘just war.’56 Between 1943 and 1944, the number of Hollywood scripts read by the 
OWI increased by 60 percent. Issues of race, themes of corruption, military or political 
distortions, and instances of Americans oblivious to war were all characteristics ‘fixed’ 
by the OWI and the BMP.57 The control these government agencies held over the 
industry was, according to Koppes and Black “an influence over an American mass 
medium never equaled before or since.” 
 As the war began to come to a close, however, these war-entrenched plots and 
themes began to decrease in popularity, and messages revolved more around pure 
entertainment and religion. With Truman’s ascension to the Presidency and the war 
coming to a definite close, the OWI was disbanded by late 1945.58  
 Following the OWI’s reign, two distinct and yet related themes gathered 
extreme popularity across various media in the U.S. These two themes, espionage and 
brainwashing, served to reinforce the manichean frame established by the rhetoric of 
Truman and Churchill. Although espionage plots in film were present before the Cold 
War, they were often just vehicles by which to tell an entertaining story.59 During the                                                         
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1950s specifically, however, these two concepts took on significant weight for the 
American people, influencing their perceptions of the Communist threat both abroad 
and at home. 
B. Print Journalism: framing the enemy and the origins of brainwashing and 
espionage 
In 1950, the term brainwashing first appeared publicly in a Miami News article 
written by Edward Hunter, a foreign news correspondent with ties to the CIA.60 
Although the term was used earlier that year in a secret CIA report, it wasn’t until 
Hunt’s article titled “‘Brain-Washing’ Tactics Force Chinese Into Ranks of Communist 
Party”61 was published that the term really gained traction in the minds of the American 
people. The popularity of the concept throughout the duration of the 1950s can be 
shown by the fact that the term brainwashing appeared in the New York Times in 251 
occasions.62 Even before Hunter’s article popularized the term, the concept of mind 
control was a hot topic amongst government officials and the general public. In fact this 
and other speculations about Communist subversive ideological warfare techniques had 
entered the mainstream in the 1940s through public trials, literature, and film. 
 Rumors of psychological warfare used by Nazi Germany and the subversive 
effects of propaganda both at home and abroad were issues at the forefront of concerns 
for both the U.S. government and the American people. In fact, throughout the World 
Wars propaganda and psychological persuasion techniques were a large part of                                                         
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government strategy in swaying public opinion for U.S. involvement. The rise of mass 
advertising and an increase in studying the psychological effects of subversive and 
subliminal messaging coincided with the changing climate of international relations. 
This, combined with the fear-provoking rhetoric used by world leaders and a series of 
real historical events set the framework for the American obsession with brainwashing 
and Two significant events which perpetuated the credibility of brainwashing and 
espionage, both in Communist countries and specifically on American soil, were the 
trial of Joseph Mindszenty and the convictions of the Rosenbergs in 1951. As Cold War 
historian Ellen Schrecker asserted, these two trials were pivotal in changing “the vague 
and largely ideological threat of Communism into something much more concrete: real 
people taking real actions that seemed to be a part of a Moscow-led conspiracy.”63 
 In 1949, political activist and Hungarian Catholic official Mindszenty was tried 
and convicted of treason. He was extremely outspoken against the Communist regime 
and yet when he was tried, he confessed to the crimes which he had consistently 
denied.64 This, along with his feeble demeanor at the trial gave many reason to surmise 
that he had been tortured, brainwashed, or even--according to the New York Times--had 
a ‘lobotomy’ performed.65 A 1949 article published in Time called “Their Tongues Cut 
Off” questioned Mindszenty’s radical change in tune, saying “Somehow they [Russia] 
broke Joseph Mindszenty, man of burning courage. Somehow they made him say things 
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he had denied with the utmost vehemence, and with full knowledge of the 
consequences, until his arrest 40 days before.”66 
 Then, in 1950, two American citizens living in New York City named Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg, were arrested over accusations of espionage. Although Julius was 
deemed the main conspirator of the two, the evidence reflected that the Rosenbergs had 
in fact been involved with a series of other pro-Soviet Americans in smuggling 
information about the workings of the “Manhattan Project,” a top-secret program tasked 
with the development of the atomic bomb. . After a 3 year-long trial the Rosenbergs 
were executed, survived? by their 2 young children. According to Matthew Dunne, 
author of A Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society, the 
trials effectively emphasized the Communist threat at home. He says, “the trials also 
blurred the lines between foreign, Communist others and apparently normal American 
citizens…Communism was a political party with totalitarian aspirations; it was a 
subversive and un-American idea” and above all: “it could be practiced by your next-
door neighbor.” 
 The press interpretations of the trial are especially important in understanding its 
effect on the American psyche at the time. Many headlines and print stories labeled the 
two as the “Atom Spy Couple,” and direct quotes from those involved successfully 
sensationalized the trial without much need for exaggeration from the press. In general, 
“newspapers throughout the country ran editorials condemning the Rosenbergs for their 
crimes and expressing confidence that they were being treated fairly by the American 
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judicial system.”67 For example, two articles which were run just months apart in the 
Los Angeles Times each denounced the couple and sought to place their crimes as a part 
of the larger picture in the minds of the public. The first titled “Communists and the 
Rosenberg Case” stated “such extremes of individual conceit as they and [British 
atomic spy] Dr. [Alan Nunn] May have shown cannot be tolerated. Not even here, in the 
citadel of freedom, can one person arrogate to himself the moral right to jeopardize 
all.”68 The second, titled “They May Have Condemned Millions,” asserted: “…many 
Americans and others in the free nations still remain blithely oblivious of the magnitude 
of the threat implicit in this international conspiracy and strangely unmoved by the 
depravity of those who willingly served and continue to serve its godless and inhuman 
goals.”69 Another article published in 1951 by the New York Times quoted the presiding 
Judge Kaufman as having “described the defendant's crime as "worse than murder" and 
"a sordid, dirty business.””70 A variety of quotes from participants in the trial, jurists 
and observers alike, were published nationwide, echoing Kaufman’s sentiment.  
 In summation, press coverage of both the Mindszenty and Rosenberg trials not 
only mirrored the manichean rhetoric of world leaders like Churchill and Truman but 
also indicate that the press itself was picking up on this type of language. becoming a 
real trend. From the presiding judge’s use of manichean language and its adoption by 
the press, the developmental path towards a persistent dualistic frame used by both the 
government and journalists to describe the Communist threat clear. Thus, a dualistic,                                                         
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manichean perception of Soviet Russia and its aims continued to be reinforced at both 
local and governmental levels of American life during the Cold War. 
C. In Film: reinforcing manichean interpretations through science-fiction plots  
The prevalent American belief that “Communist governments systematically 
manipulated and controlled their civilian populations”71 on U.S. soil, reinforced by such 
cases as Mindszenty and the Rosenbergs and by the manichean rhetoric of both the 
media and prominent politicians, can be seen by the development of certain genres in 
Hollywood films at the time. During the early years of the Cold War, the largely 
Christian U.S. population was presented with film portrayals of good citizens versus 
totalitarian regimes. These films, like Cecil B. DeMille’s popular The Ten 
Commandments, utilized the concept of ‘free will under god’ to juxtapose to the anti-
religious sentiments and totalitarian government present in the East. Although many 
times, villains and their country of origin in these films were not explicitly stated, there 
was a definite implication that they were representations of Communists based on 
character features, storyline, setting, etc. By understanding this aspect of American 
culture, it is logical that the manichean rhetoric initially presented by leading political 
figures would be incorporated into the everyday vocabulary of the largely Christian 
Americans. This black-and-white morality was reinforced time and time again by the 
cinema, which was one of the most popular media outlets of the era. 
  It is important to note that more popular, mainstream depictions of themes of 
mind control, espionage, and broader conflicts between manichean forces can be 
observed in a multitude of genres and media touched upon, but not fully discussed here.                                                         
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I chose to focus this next section on one single subset of plots of films, which at the 
time were not the most popular, for a reason. I posit that the rise of specific plots within 
the genre of science fiction can be analyzed as a reflection of the most hyperbolic 
manifestations of very real Cold War fears present in the minds of the American public. 
By using the vehicle of science fiction, I show that the resulting outlandish and 
nonsensical portrayals of the Communist threat are indicative of the most extreme 
interpretations of the persistent framing techniques used to identify the manichean 
powers at play during the early Cold War. As Matthew W. Dunne says in his book “A 
Cold War State of Mind: Brainwashing and Postwar American Society,” “Nowhere was 
the theme of the superhuman and subhuman Communist enemy more prevalent than in 
the science fiction and horror films of the 1950s.”72  
Within the genre of science fiction, plots involving mind-controlling alien 
invaders posing as American citizens were portrayed by a variety of films. Productions 
like Invaders from Mars (1953), It Came from Outer Space (1954), and later films 
produced around the same time and or based on already popular stories like Invasion of 
the Body Snatchers (1956)  and The Brain Eaters (1958) all contained elements of 
foreign invasion and mind control. According to Peter Biskind, cultural critic and 
journalist, “possession by pods—mind stealing, brain eating, and body snatching—
[was] an overt metaphor for Communist brainwashing…”73 In each of these films, 
enemy invaders “who had the ability to mimic normal American citizens, control their 
minds, and turn them into cold, inhuman slaves” used their superior inhuman powers to 
conquer their targets. These adversaries more often than not were fully detached from                                                         
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their bodies, reinforcing their inhumanness through their physical lack of a human body 
with the exception of their brains. This view of detached, subversive entities seeking 
control over intellect is an example of some of the most extreme depictions of the 
reality of American fears. As Dunne said of his analysis of such films: 
If the films’ alien invaders represented the unchecked and insane 
intelligence of the superhuman Communist hierarchy, the cold inhuman 
townspeople who were turned into unwilling but complicit slaves 
represented the subhuman, brainwashed disciples of Communism the 
world over.74 
As a result, through these science-fiction depictions of brainwashing and alien invasion, 
fears already expressed by journalists and government agents were voiced to their 
absolute extremes. The fear of a two-pronged threat of internal, subversive enemies and 
the possibility of foreign invasion were prevalent aspects of science fiction films in the 
1950s. 
 One of the most important roles that these films played in building perceptions 
of the Communist threat are their unique, multi-layered portrayals of good and evil. On 
the one hand, many of the plots of these films mirrored popular religious themes in a 
non-mainstream manner. Although they use large-scale extraterrestrial battles between 
‘good’ American townspeople and ‘evil’ alien invaders, the themes conveyed are 
remarkably similar to the depictions of morality in more popular films like The Ten 
Commandments. The stark, often cheaply portrayed contrasts between good and evil in 
these science-fiction films can easily be compared to both propaganda-entrenched films 
at the end of WWII and the Oscar-winning films of the early 1950s.75 On a lower 
intellectual scale, these films offered audiences “effective propaganda by offering                                                         
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simple, easily digestible, emotive messages in highly charged, usually action-driven 
formats.”76 Furthermore, the heroes of these films “frequently championed the folksy 
wisdom and resourcefulness of the American townspeople…”77 Along with religion-
centric movies like The Ten Commandments and The Prisoner (a film based on the trial 
of Mindszenty), common thematic elements which often hinged on dualistic perceptions 
of morality “helped to endow the Cold War with the black-and-white moral clarity that 
most people and official propagandists sought.”78 Altogether, the bizarre hyperbolic 
portrayals of the Communist threat in science-fiction films reflected just how 
“expansive the image of the Communist enemy was in American popular culture,”79 
from the most mainstream of genres to the fringes of the film industry. 
D. Broadcast News 
 While the origins of how the Communist threat was framed in popular media 
hold significant weight in the discussion of identifying the common national narrative 
that developed at the start of the Cold War, it is equally important to investigate how 
manichean rhetoric was used to frame Communism in the realm of broadcast 
journalism. Following Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman’s lead, a variety 
of broadcast outlets picked up on their dualistic, manichean language in everyday 
disseminations of world and national news. The importance of radio, and eventually 
television news, in daily American life during the 1950s and beyond is undeniable. As 
such, its content warrants an examination of the persistence of manichean rhetoric as it 
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continued to reinforce the national narrative through which American and Soviet forces 
were framed in the U.S.. 
i. Radio: Origins and Voice of America 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, radio experienced a Golden Age as one of the 
most popular news and entertainment outlets in America. By 1934 “60 percent of the 
nation’s households had radios,” and “One and a half million cars were also equipped 
with them.”80 During WWII, the amount of news broadcasted increased significantly 
and in 1940, the number of total radio stations was at an all-time high of 765 in the 
U.S.81 In fact, “Before the the first truly successful television broadcasts early in the 
1940s, radio was the only broadcast medium…For two decades radio was king.”82 
Although the end of the war would herald a transition from network radio to a new age 
of network television as the most popular source of broadcast news and entertainment, 
radio would remain a prominent medium throughout the Cold War. 
 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, this transition from radio to television 
was marked by increases in “network reporters…doing double duty, being heard on 
radio as well as being seen on TV.”83 As a result, although TV was gaining momentum 
as the preferred news platform, “radio was still important, especially at the local level, 
where stations often found it beneficial to maintain a strong news department to keep 
                                                        
80Scott, Carole. “History of the Radio Industry in the United States to 1940″. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited 
by Robert Whaples. March 26, 2008. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-history-of-the-radio-industry-
in-the-united-states-to-1940/ 
81History of the Radio Industry in the United States to 1940″. 
82Bondi, Victor. "Radio: The End of a Golden Age." In American Decades: 1940-1949, 375. Detroit: 
Gale Research, 1995. 
83Vaughn, Stephen. Encyclopedia of American Journalism. New York: Routledge, 2008. 435. 
  
32  
the community informed.”84 
 One of the most influential wartime radio programs that remained viable during 
the Cold War was the government initiated Voice of America (VOA), which in fact ran 
from 1942 to 2006.85 Initiated by the OWI in 1942, John Chancellor, broadcast 
journalist and 1965 VOA director said that the program functioned “at the crossroads of 
journalism and diplomacy.”86 This description, according to Stephen L. Vaughn’s 
Encyclopedia of American Journalism, encapsulated the principal goals of the program, 
which more specifically was used to “inform listeners in other nations about life in the 
United States.”87 On the other hand, its Charter (P.L. 94-350) states that VOA serves to 
“present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively and will also present 
responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.”88 As a government-sponsored 
program, the interpretation of “responsible discussion and opinion” is vague, and 
reporting unbiased to the aims and agendas of the federal government seemed unlikely.  
As Vaughn says, in counter to Chancellor’s statement,  “In such a situation, journalism 
and diplomacy may operate at cross-purposes…”89  
 VOA’s very first transmission in February of 1942 began thus: “Daily, at this 
time, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good or bad. 
We shall tell you the truth.”90 Identifying VOA and America with ‘the truth’, this 
statement can immediately imply that other news sources at the time were dishonest. In 
reality, VOA did report American wartime losses and other military challenges;                                                         
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however, it often failed to report controversies at home, especially in regards to growing 
civil disobedience in the name of racial equality. The phrase “lying by omission” comes 
to mind. Furthermore, at the close of the war many Americans were skeptical that VOA 
would separate from its propagandist roots, and it was in fact generally viewed 
negatively as a mouthpiece for the Democratic administration. Following WWII, the 
VOA was absorbed by the State Department and suffered from budget cuts, partly as a 
result of its unfavorable origins. Relatively soon thereafter, “Associated Press and 
United Press withdrew their services, not wishing to be linked with a ‘propaganda 
operation.’”91  
 Then, in 1948 as a response to growing concern over the rise in anti-Western 
propaganda from Soviet countries, the Smith-Mundt Act was passed. This act “made 
United States government international informational and educational services 
permanent.” The subsequent “war of words between West and East” sparked the 
creation of even more of these informational radio programs, like Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty, and more.92  The VOA’s journalistic approach to educational 
programming during the early years of the Cold War remained, as some skeptics had 
feared, similar to the American propaganda efforts of the war. Broadcast content 
focused heavily on “strong attacks on the enemy (Communist governments), support for 
their long-suffering people, positive treatment of democratic institutions, and emphasis 
on U.S. military and economic strength.”93 Specifically in attempts to reach third-world 
countries feared to be vulnerable to Communist ideologies, “VOA broadcasts 
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emphasized U.S. financial and technological aid to the emerging nations…They 
criticized dictatorial practices of Communist governments, while highlighting U.S. 
economic and military strength”94 abroad and in a multitude of languages. 
 In 1953 the VOA fell under the United States Information Agency (USIA) and 
was still heavily influenced by the State Department. These influences affected the 
VOA on a variety of levels, from guidelines regulating personnel to censorship of 
“sensitive issues.”95 Throughout the early years of the Cold War, VOA programming 
content was determined by “guidance” from government agents.96 One example of such 
guidance can be seen in the VOA handling of the 1949 Chinese Revolution, which 
involved a regime change from Nationalist powers to Communism in the Asian country. 
VOA was internally conflicted, with policy makers trying to balance the need to 
maintain credibility with the Chinese people while at the same time remain true to their 
aims of refuting Communism. As a result, VOA got caught in the middle of domestic 
policy debates and more often than not was seen at home as favoring the administration 
and its aims.97 
 Similar to the reflexive implications of the first few words spoken in VOA’s 
initial 1942 broadcast, one significant aspect of its programming during the early years 
of the Cold War were the implications of its content. Using Voice of America to 
broadcast U.S. policy and culture abroad, declarations of the “truth” and freedom of 
press reporting served to emphasize the goodness of America, while simultaneously 
                                                        
94Vaughn. Encyclopedia. 569. 
95Vaughn. Encyclopedia. 570. 
96Krugler, David F. The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953. Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2000. 94. 
97Krugler. The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953. 95. 
  
35  
putting down foreign press practices, either by implication or direct accusation. One 
major example of this propagandist tactic can be seen in Truman’s 1950 “Campaign of 
Truth.” As a result of the increase in American propaganda broadcasts behind the Iron 
Curtain, a variety of Soviet efforts focused on jamming transmission of VOA to the 
Eastern Bloc. The CIA estimated that in 1950, during the time of these jamming efforts, 
VOA effectiveness rate was between only 15 and 20 percent.98 Announced through a 
speech given to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Truman declared this 
campaign as a response to Soviet jamming, asserting that “VOA was often the only 
source of news for captive peoples” behind the Iron Curtain.99 Furthermore, Truman 
called for a campaign which “Through the truth, the United States and the free world 
would refute lies and deliver positive messages about the American people and their 
nation’s policies.”100 Truman and his supporters continued frame VOA as an honest 
news outlet devoid of efforts of subversive influence, differentiating it from the so-
called propagandist broadcasts employed by the Soviets. As a result, VOA was a 
government tool used to build upon and extend the reach of the pre-established national 
narrative, which used manichean rhetoric to frame the growing conflict between the two 
international superpowers, both domestically and abroad. 
ii. Television News Broadcasts: Murrow and CBS vs. McCarthy 
One of the most prominent American reporters of both WWII and the Cold War 
era was Edward R. Murrow. According to Vaughn’s Encyclopedia of American 
Journalism, by “1950 Murrow was among the nation’s most dominant broadcast                                                         
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newsman.”101 During WWII he and his team revolutionized the news game by changing 
radio reporting from an in-studio production to on-the-spot reporting in war zones. 
Furthermore, Murrow had his own weekday evening radio report beginning in 1947 and 
spanning 12 years called “Edward R. Murrow and the News.” His next concurrent 
venture would be into the exponentially rising realm of television broadcast news. 
According to Thomas Rosteck, author of See It Now Confronts McCarthyism: 
Television Documentary and the Politics of Representation, “Where in 1947 only 
roughly 1 in 100 homes had television receivers, by 1955 nearly 80 in 100 owned at 
least one receiver.”102 In light of the obvious influence television had over the American 
public, it is no wonder the already popular Murrow became an active part of the nascent 
medium’s entry into journalism. In 1951, CBS President Fred Friendly and Murrow 
created the now-famous documentary news series See It Now, which aired from 1951 to 
1958. The next section analyzes CBS’s See It Now and Murrow’s role in contesting the 
activities and accusations of rising Senator Joseph McCarthy to bring to light some of 
the struggles of broadcast news which affected their role in the marketplace of ideas 
during the Cold War. 
 In the very first broadcast of See It Now, Murrow said: ”No journalistic age was 
ever given a weapon for truth with quite the same scope of this fledgling television.” 
This statement would be reinforced by Murrow’s later 4-series telecast, the most well-
known content of See It Now, which dealt with the growing accusations and hypocrisies 
of Wisconsin Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Although personally a staunch anti-
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Communist, Murrow was well-known for presenting the news without his own political 
or social biases. Although he did offer audiences his own interpretations and 
commentary, as a journalist he was committed to presenting the facts and letting 
viewers form their own opinions. Murrow felt very strongly that the growing 
accusations against prominent individuals, accusations including complaints against 
government officials, military men, and a variety of other players by McCarthy and the 
House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) were largely unfounded. 
McCarthy and his supporters continuously asserted knowledge of secret Communist 
activity at all levels of government and in the field of journalism, and their public 
attacks often led to ruined reputations and public embarrassment for the accused. As a 
popular public figure, journalist and American citizen, Murrow firmly believed that 
many of McCarthy’s accusations lacked substantiation and violated the accused’s civil 
liberties. 
 For a time, Murrow kept his discontent over McCarthy and his actions quiet, or 
addressed them in more abstract terms. The first notorious public HUAC congressional 
hearings, mirroring the accusations and tactics of McCarthy, occurred in 1947 and were 
mainly centered around rumored Communist activity within Hollywood. A total of 43 
Hollywood writers, producers, and directors were publicly called to testify, a majority 
of whom used the trial to denounce the investigation and were ultimately sent to prison 
and or blacklisted from the industry.Discussing the 1947 HUAC investigations, Murrow 
commented that Congressional committees tend to focus on individual’s actions rather 
than “what individuals think.”103 Then, in 1949, Alger Hiss, a U.S. diplomat, was found                                                         
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guilty of denying his role in passing secret U.S. documents to a former Communist 
agent. In 1950, the Rosenbergs were also accused of passing American secrets on to 
Soviet agents. Although these defamatory trials and public accusations predated 
McCarthy’s election to public office, they would set the stage for his like-minded 
attacks on a variety of American people. 
 The senator’s role and the so-called start of “McCarthyism,” which occurred 
during the early years of the Cold War, began at a dinner party when McCarthy stated 
he had a list of 205 employees in the U.S. State Department with known ties to 
Communism. Over the next four years he would play a prominent role in creating a 
period of civil rights violations and sensationalist accusations against a variety of well-
known and often innocent American officials. Two crucial aspects to McCarthy’s 
success were his knowledge of the press and its advantages, as well as his powerful 
allies in the media.104 He began mornings with “press conferences to announce 
afternoon press conferences in which he promised to reveal startling new information 
thus grabbing the afternoon headlines without providing any actual information. Often 
the afternoon press conferences would never take place.”105 His role as a Senator 
classified his statements as factual news, thus newspapers didn’t go the extra mile to 
substantiate his claims. His allies included the powerful Hearst chain and Colonel 
Robert McCormick’s Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald, all of who were 
“champions of anti-Communist efforts and supported McCarthy’s contributions to that 
cause.”106Outspoken critics of McCarthy included the Milwaukee Journal, the Capital 
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Times of Madison, Wisconsin, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, as 
well as figures such as the columnists Drew Pearson, Joseph Alsop, Stewart Alsop, 
radio commentator Elmer Davis, and Edward Murrow.107 Despite the number and 
stature of his critics, McCarthy and his anti-Communist efforts were sustained for many 
years. According to Rosteck, McCarthy was successful in being highly publicized in the 
press nationwide. Rosteck says that reports on the Senator’s activities reached “a peak 
in 1954, when it was not unusual for a paper to carry fifteen to twenty stories a day in 
which McCarthy was the central figure. A like proportion of McCarthy stories figured 
in radio and television news.”108  
 McCarthy’s strategy towards the press was twofold in that he used the medium 
of TV to his advantage, and yet also continuously accused citizens in the field of 
broadcast journalism of having communist ties and sympathies. In 1950 he first 
appeared on national television in the midst of the Tydings Subcomittee, a Senate 
committee tasked with investigating McCarthy’s very first claims of Communist 
activity in the State Department. Ultimately this investigation failed to reach 
conclusions or indict anyone, largely because McCarthy’s accusations were inconsistent 
and their direction changed constantly.109 Although he continued to appear on national 
television, some stations refused to air some of his speeches due to their libelous 
nature.110 Despite the fact that in one of the initial 1951 broadcasts of See It Now 
Murrow pointed out the hypocrisy of McCarthy’s ongoing claims and actions using 
McCarthy’s own words, the Senator continued to gain immense popularity with the                                                         
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general public, while simultaneously gathering enemies in the broadcast world and 
within political parties—his own party included. 
McCarthy continued to attack both public officials and broadcast journalism. In 
May of 1952, McCarthy announced, "We have a vast number of communists in the 
press and radio," and he demanded lists of State Department contracts with radio-TV 
newsmen.”111 He went even further when, in February of 1953, he accused the 
government-funded, largely propagandist Voice of America of "mismanagement and 
subversion,”112 with he and his witnesses “taking the position that anything less than 
complete denunciation of Communists and enthusiastic praise for anti-Communists was 
subversion.”113  
The irony in attacking VOA was that many politicians did in fact see the 
program as incredibly propagandist, and yet McCarthy accused the content of not going 
far enough. McCarthy’s increasing role as a public figure and intervention activities 
within the realm of broadcast journalism served to effectively silence the majority of 
dissenting opinions. According to Rosteck and research by founding dean of the 
Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley Edwin Bayley: 
 
…the networks were subject to strict government regulation, and 
executives in the industry reasoned that the McCarthyites had influence 
among the regulators and regulatory commissions. Moreover…the 
tradition of the sponsor system, under which at the time an advertiser 
was held responsible for the content of programs, further weakened the 
industry's resolve. Extreme pressure was mounted in many cases by 
advertisers who were fearful of negative publicity and subsequent market 
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problems should any of their sponsored programs or associated 
celebrities be "exposed" as suspect.114 
As Vaughn asserts, these fears of financial, government, and publicity repercussions 
“led to the failure of the press to provide readers with complete information.”115 
Through an examination of the most famous See It Now telecasts, only three of which 
will be analyzed here and which dealt specifically with the growing trend of 
McCarthyism, and their impact on the CBS network and its employees, it is possible to 
understand how Murrow and Friendly’s attack on the senator played out in real-life and 
in regards to the aforementioned fears of broadcast journalists. 
 See It Now aired its first of four telecasts regarding McCarthyism and the 
increasing trend of “guilt by association” in October of 1953, sparking a series of 
broadcasts, which were at the time extremely risky and largely unheralded.  "The Case 
of Milo Radulovich” was at face-value the tale of an unknown Air Force Reserve 
lieutenant who faced dismissal after being deemed "security risk.” As Murrow and 
Friendly would present it, this became a story of McCarthyism and a case of guilt by 
association. The story centered around Lt. Milo Radulovich, who had been “asked to 
resign from the Air Force Reserves because his father and sister were accused of having 
Communist sympathies.” Murrow interviewed Radulovich, his accused family 
members, and residents of his hometown in defense of the lieutenant. Murrow 
concluded with “a personal appeal: “And it seems to us that—that is, to Fred Friendly 
and myself—that this is a subject that should be argued about endlessly.””116 Following 
public disapproval of Radulovich’s treatment, a few weeks later on See It Now the Air                                                         
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Force announced that the lieutenant was reinstated in good favor with the military. 
Although Murrow did not directly attack McCarthy, this evidently successful telecast 
was the first real investigation of civil rights violations in response to reckless anti-
Communist sentiment and rising, often unsubstantiated accusations from McCarthy and 
his followers. 
 One month after the Radulovich episode, Murrow and Friendly aired the second 
telecast piece called “An Argument in Indianapolis”, covering the cancellation of a 
meeting to establish a chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU, protector 
of American civil rights) due to its “controversial” nature117. Rosteck notes that the 
second broadcast, “An Argument in Indianapolis,” was an examination into “the 
suspicion and fear attendant on anything ‘controversial’. "118 Vaughn said this of the 
first two See It Now telecasts: “Neither the Radulovich nor Indianapolis stories 
mentioned McCarthy’s name, but Murrow’s message was clear: The excesses of 
McCarthyism were stripping individuals of their rights as American citizens.”119 The 
months following this episode gave rise to both an increase in criticism from 
McCarthyof a variety of issues within the field of broadcast news, as well as 
controversial events involving the senator’s public accusations against a decorated 
military official. Also in the coming months, CBS’ Friendly and Murrow were planning 
an attack on McCarthy. They approached the McCarthy program cautiously, choosing 
to use McCarthy’s own words as the focus of the content and waiting for the optimal 
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time to air it.120 
 Four months after this broadcast on March 9, 1954, the third and one of the most 
controversial telecasts aired, titled “A Report on Senator McCarthy.” Murrow opens the 
episode saying:  
Good evening. Tonight See It Now devotes its entire half hour to a report 
on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy told mainly in his own words and 
pictures… Because a report on Senator McCarthy is by definition 
controversial… If the Senator feels that we have done violence to his 
words or pictures—and desires, so to speak, to answer for himself—an 
opportunity will be afforded him on this program.121 
The bulk of the program is then revealed, with clips of McCarthy on the offense, in 
trials, public statements, and other recorded instances. The screen alternately pans back 
to Murrow, who reads from a script the blatant contradictions in McCarthy’s statements 
over time and correcting facts that the senator got wrong. Although the title of the 
episode and Murrow’s opening statements speak of objectivity, the segment itself is 
clearly biased against McCarthy. Murrow famously concludes:  
The actions of the junior Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and 
dismay amongst our allies abroad, and given considerable comfort to our 
enemies. And whose fault is that? Not really his. He didn’t create this 
situation of fear; he merely exploited it—and rather successfully. Cassius 
was right. ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves. 
Good night, and good luck.122 
 Acknowledging the extremely controversial nature of the broadcast, this 
particular segment was not advertised by CBS, and in fact, like the previous Radulovich 
segment, Murrow and Friendly pooled their personal funds to advertise it. The episode 
wasn’t aired by many affiliates, broadcasted in a total 36 cities with just 9.2 percent of 
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all Americans with TV receivers watching.123 The response, however, was as 
overwhelming as it was unprecedented. With 2.4 million people watching, a majority of 
responses were in Murrow’s favor.124 According to Rosteck’s research: 
CBS received more than 12,000 telephone calls in the twenty-four hours 
after the broadcast, and those praising the telecast outnumbered those 
who were critical by fifteen to one. At CBS affiliates across the country 
the ratio was much the same. Over 3,200 complimentary telegrams 
arrived, along with fewer than 250 negative responses.125 
See It Now continued to reveal to audiences gaping holes in McCarthy’s accusations 
and logic and the Senator’s response was to accuse Murrow of being a Communist 
sympathizer and leader of the “jackal pack which is always found at the throat of 
anyone who dares to expose individual Communists and traitor.” McCarthy’s rebuttal 
was largely unfavorable and did more damage to his public appearance, especially 
during a tense time in which McCarthy was still dealing with the repercussions of his 
accusations of an army general. As a result of the negative publicity accrued by 
televised hearings in which McCarthy argued against decorated army officials, in 
tandem with the negative light cast upon him by the See It Now fiasco, he ultimately 
lost favor with the American public and was censured by the Senate in December 1954. 
 Despite the popularity and obvious success of Murrow and Friendly’s attack on 
Senator McCarthy, tensions behind the scenes of CBS led to See It Now being cut 
down, marginalized, and ultimately cancelled in 1958.126 The decline of Murrow’s 
favor within CBS largely had to do with the station’s relationships with sponsors and 
the commercialized direction network television was headed. The text paired with an                                                         
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archival collection from Tufts University notes that “Over time, the broadcasting 
industry increasingly passed over news and education broadcasts in favor of more 
lucrative entertainment programs.”127 Murrow, an adamant critic of the role advertisers 
played in the successes or failures of TV and radio shows, often wouldn’t allow 
commercials or sponsor announcements to interrupt his programming. The sponsor of 
See It Now’s “A Report on Senator McCarthy,” an aluminum producer named ALCOA, 
refused to fund the costs of the awaited reply from Senator McCarthy and eventually 
cancelled its sponsorship as a result of the increasingly controversial specials for which 
Murrow became famous. Thus, the award-winning See It Now was cancelled and 
Murrow cast out of favor with CBS due to the demands of its corporate sponsors and 
internal conflict. 
E. National narrative within the marketplace of ideas 
According to the website uscivilliberties.org, the marketplace of ideas is defined 
as: “…the notion that, with minimal government intervention—a laissez faire approach 
to the regulation of speech and expression—ideas, theories, propositions, and 
movements will succeed or fail on their own merits.”128 
In the U.S., the concept of the marketplace of ideas has become a crucial factor in 
keeping the government in check and keeping democracy alive and well over the years. 
One of the greatest historical threats to the success of the marketplace of ideas has been 
threat inflation, a process that occurred during the early Cold War and beyond as                                                         
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evidenced by the words and actions of primary participants of the era, from politicians 
and press alike. 
  In the introduction of American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat 
Inflation Since 9/11, editors Jane K. Cramer and Trevor Thrall define threat inflation as: 
“the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and 
urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify,” with the added caveat that, “Many 
scholars, including several in this volume, do not find this definition a perfect one to 
describe the process.”129 There are four primary explanations for threat inflations 
recognized by scholars and noted in the collection. A brief understanding of these four 
will allow us to better analyze how the national manichean narrative of “us versus 
them” functioned, both successfully and as a failure, in the American marketplace of 
ideas during the early Cold War. 
  The first of these, as set forth by Cramer and Thrall on pages 3-4 of the 
introduction, is a realist explanation, and can be summed up as a situation in which 
“…what appears to be “threat inflation” is really the result of leaders attempting to cope 
with uncertainty. For realists, overestimations of threats are the inevitable, regular 
consequence of insufficient intelligence and the opacity of other states’ intentions.”130 
The second is a psychological explanation, which asserts that threat inflation “begins 
with the observation that people often interpret facts in ways that support their 
expectations and in ways that support plausible arguments about potential threats even 
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when the facts do not warrant such conclusions.”131 The third is a domestic political 
explanation, asserting that threat inflation results either as the “sincere efforts to act in 
the public interest or manipulative strategies to gain political advantage, increase 
institutional budgets, or to advance other goals kept hidden from the public and political 
opposition.”132 This explanation also deals heavily with the media’s role in contributing 
to the rise of public fear and exacerbating threat inflation domestically. The fourth and 
final theory is the constructivist explanation, which can be summarized as “threats are 
what we make of them…national and cultural identities, norms, and myths will heavily 
color threat perceptions and the success of elite threat inflation efforts.”133 It seems as 
though in discussing threat inflation during the Cold War, aspects of all four of these 
theories play a role. The next section, however, will focus on the constructivist 
explanation, as it is also a unique “take on the standard domestic political understanding 
of the role of the marketplace of ideas in the threat inflation process,”134 along with an 
examination of the media’s role in threat inflation during the early years of the Cold 
War. I assert that the constructivist perspective that  “symbolic politics and framing 
efforts based on world-views and values” are critical to the development of public 
opinion,135 coupled with a definite lack of credible and alternate factual news sources 
domestically during the early Cold War prevented effective discussion in the 
marketplace of ideas. What little credible opposition that was present in the news, 
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specifically evidenced by the example of See It Now, failed because of the capitalist 
economic structure to which influential media outlets were and are bound. 
i. Constructivist Explanations and Myths of Empire 
According to Cramer and Thrall, a constructivist view asserts that the general 
public is “most responsive to threat inflation efforts when leaders use rhetoric that 
highlights cultural and national differences.”136 These types of “social-psychological 
arguments”137 often will ring most true amongst everyday people because it plays upon 
some of the strongest facets of American identity, such as the emphasis of individualism 
and freedom during the Cold War in the face of a Soviet-Communist ideology of 
collectivism and a totalitarian regime. The persistence of language which highlights 
such cultural and national differences is ever-present in the rhetoric and arguments 
printed in daily newspaper articles, in radio programming, and in TV broadcasts—as 
evidenced in the previous sections of Part II. The origins of this rhetoric is 
chronologically clear: in the major speeches and language used by leaders at the highest 
levels of government.  
 Part of this rhetoric holds roots in a series of myths of empires that persisted in 
the beliefs of elites and thus persisted in the beliefs of the general public. Primarily, the 
strongly-held American beliefs in manifest destiny, the domino theory, big stick 
diplomacy, and offensive advantage significantly affected the rhetoric of these leaders 
and were pervasive in the media. Although many scholars maintain that in hindsight 
these beliefs are and were false, it is still important not to discredit their weight for 
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decision-makers at the time.138 Although presently scholars and politicians alike can see 
the improbability of the domino theory, for example, our current faults with the theory 
should not get in the way of our knowledge that this belief of many politicians held 
strong influences over decision-making during the Cold War.139 As a result, according 
to Robert Jervis: 
During the Cold War, members of the political and economic elite who 
incorrectly said that the establishment of revolutionary regimes 
anywhere in the world would menace American security interests were 
not lying. Rather, the knowledge that such regimes would adversely 
affect their economic interests led them to believe that American national 
security was at stake as well.140  
This is one example of a sincere belief in the importance of the American economic 
framework aimed at protecting the common good, but nonetheless driven by personal 
interest. Although it may be incorrect, it’s these types of beliefs and their context that 
ultimately led to President Truman, McCarthy, and other key politicians to believe that 
the Communist threat they faced was in fact a conflict of epic manichean proportion not 
to be taken lightly. Furthermore, in a process which Stephen Van Evera calls 
“blowback,” “the myths of empire may become ingrained in the psyche of the people 
and the institutions of their state.”141 All of the aforementioned myths of empire— big 
stick diplomacy, the domino theory, etc.— were all theories predating the Cold War, 
and yet they continued to play a significant role in shaping the decision of policy 
makers at the time. Thus, Van Evera’s theory appears to hold true regarding key beliefs 
which influenced leading public figures during the early Cold War, yet which now 
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appear misguided and false. 
ii. Militarized Patriotism and Self-Censorship 
 Two other key ideas crucial to understanding how the national narrative of a 
manichean conflict between Communist and democratic ideologies functioned in the 
early Cold War are the concept of “militarized patriotism” and resulting self-censorship 
by the press. Professor Jane Cramer argues, similar to some of the arguments in this 
thesis, that: 
 …the rise of militarism during the Cold War, caused by perceived large 
external threats and the growth of a very large military industrial 
complex, led to the distorting of “ordinary patriotism” into “militarized 
patriotism” where citizens or leaders who questioned or opposed 
maintaining strong military forces or questioned or opposed reflexively 
using military force to defend or promote national interests were labeled 
as “unpatriotic.” Hence, “militarized patriotism” is the causal mechanism 
through which a militarized political culture is manifested and affects 
behavior in the marketplace of ideas.142 
As a result, politicians and news media outlets “were constrained in their individual 
behavior by cultural norms of behavior.” Fears of being publicly deemed “unpatriotic” 
resulted in both politicians and the press self-censoring themselves in order to not be 
seen as “weak” or unpatriotic in a time of national crisis.143 In Vaughn’s Encyclopedia 
of American Journalism, in his section on censorship, he notes that the U.S. has a 
history of relatively free press as compared to other countries. However, mainstream 
American press, again viewed comparatively, reflects less diversity of coverage and 
interpretation than that of its largest, most powerful democratic peers.144 Lack of 
diverse coverage in the U.S., stemming as far back as radio programming, is largely a 
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result of a combination of financial aspects. In particular, large newspapers, radio and 
TV broadcast stations, and other dominant news outlets are owned by the affluent and 
elite.  As evidenced by the situation in which CBS found itself due to the controversial 
nature of See It Now’s content, these wealthy owners, whose focus is on increasing 
ratings and profits, would rather not challenge the status quo—even if keeping the status 
quo comes at the expense of a well-informed public. We can see the public benefits of 
programs broadcasting verifiable argumentative content which challenges popular 
norms, as can be seen by McCarthy’s ultimate downfall following Murrow and 
Friendly’s report. However, the failure of See It Now and the lack of similar 
programming during the early years of the Cold War reflect the success of financial 
prosperity and the largely failed marketplace of ideas as a result of a media industry 
increasingly focused on profits over informing the public. As the second half of this 
thesis will show, the persistence of both manichean rhetoric in framing threats and 
failure in the marketplace of ideas, specifically in media institutions, is still a hugely 
important issue facing American government and the public today. 
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Chapter 2: Post-9/11 and the Age of Terrorism 
I. The 9/11 Attacks 
 A. Historical Context 
 i. Origins of the term and a brief history of Islamic terrorism in the 1990s 
 The word “terrorism” was born of the 18th century French Revolution’s “Reign 
of Terror.” Initially, the term meant state-sponsored acts of violence meant to squash 
opposition.145 In a 1999 30-year retrospective FBI publication exploring counter-
terrorism threat assessments, one of the first pages defines terrorism:  
Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “...the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” (28 
C.F.R.Section 0.85)146  
Since its inception during the French Revolution, terrorism has most commonly been 
linked to political aims.147 For example, one of the most well-known acts of terror in the 
20th century was the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand by a 
Serbian nationalist, an act which triggered WWI.148 
  In a 1998 New York Times article called “Terrorism's New (and Very Old) Face; 
It's Not the Kind of War the West Fights Well,” author Stephen Engelberg analyzes the 
                                                        
145"What Is Terrorism?" Supercourse. Accessed March 20, 2015. www.pitt.edu/~super7/6011-
7001/6651.ppt. 
146Terrorism in the United States 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1999. Accessed February 5, 2015. http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/terror_99.pdf 
147"What Is Terrorism?" 
148Engelberg, Stephen. "Terrorism's New (and Very Old) Face; It's Not the Kind of War the West Fights 
Well." The New York Times. September 11, 1998. Accessed May 10, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/12/arts/terrorism-s-new-and-very-old-face-it-s-not-the-kind-of-war-the-
west-fights-well.html. 
  
53  
differences between past terrorist threats to the U.S. as compared to the then-recent 
threats sponsored by Osama bin Laden. According to Engelberg, past terrorist activity 
could be directly linked to tangible political gains. For example, the Serb assassin in 
1914 was aligned with Bosnian Serbs, who “wanted to escape Austro-Hungarian rule 
and join Serbia,” or Irish attacks sought freedom from British rule in the late 20th 
century.149 According to Walter Laqueur, historian and author of the 1987 book ''The 
Age of Terrorism,’' Osama bin Laden, his followers and other terrorist groups within 
the past 25 years are motivated by something other than politics. He says ''If you look at 
books written about terrorism 25 years ago, religion doesn't appear. Statistics today 
show that more than half of terrorist activities are committed for religious or pseudo-
religious reasons.’’150 Although this statement makes it seems as though this type of 
terrorist motivation was recent to the 1990s, he cites professor and political analyst 
Bruce Hoffman who indicates that bin Laden and his contemporaries are actually 
aligned with the earliest forms of terrorism, “when religion was the main justification 
for what another scholar has termed ''holy terror.’'"151  
 During the years leading up to the 9/11 attacks, one of the biggest issues that the 
U.S. had with Al Qaeda and its aims were its abstractness. Engelberg wrote, “Experts 
say it is part of a significant trend in which terrorist groups espouse millennial or 
religious ideologies that transcend politics or national borders.”152 These vague 
geographic parameters can be seen through the multiplicity of locations in which attacks 
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by Al Qaeda occurred throughout the 1990’s. In 1992 the first documented act of Al 
Qaeda against the U.S. occurred against American troops in Somalia. Throughout the 
rest of the 1990s terrorist-led espionage and attacks against the U.S. continued to occur 
in New York, the Philippines, and other locations. According to the New York Times 
article, these attacks occurred “without state sponsors and specific goals.” The extreme 
vagueness and broad geopolitical parameters of such terrorist groups created a situation 
in which the U.S. initiated a series of attacks over different time periods and within 
different areas of the world, adding to the general mayhem already caused by the 
lawlessness of groups like Al Qaeda. Then, in August of 1996, Osama bin Laden 
declared holy war against the U.S. in a document called: “Message from Osama bin 
Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially the Arab Peninsula: 
Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Mosques.”153 
ii. Rhetorical background 
 In addition to the history of the actual terrorist attacks on various U.S. entities 
both abroad and domestically, it is important to note the origins of the rhetoric used to 
describe such circumstances leading up to G.W. Bush the younger’s official declaration 
of a national “War on Terror” narrative. For one, the president has immense influence 
over the media to deliver his own rhetoric and agenda to the American public. He has 
the administration and coordinated efforts of staff to deliver messages while opponents 
don’t have this organizational advantage. Thus, the language used by a President in 
press releases and policy speeches are often directly quoted and widely disseminated.                                                          
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  In reference to the theories of threat inflation discussed in part 1, persisting 
beliefs in certain myths of empire came into play in regards to the strategies and 
rhetoric used by leading American politicians in the decades before the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. One of the most interesting facets of American policymakers during the latter 
half of the 20th century was the proliferation of the metaphor of “war” used to describe 
policy initiatives. Whether it was the “War on Aids,” the “War on Drugs,” or the “War 
on Crime,” the metaphor was used as a vehicle by which to motivate public 
participation in a variety of efforts in times of general peace. Defense spending mirrored 
this militarized language and despite the absence of a Soviet threat, “…throughout the 
1990s, even before Osama bin Laden declared his jihad against America, U.S. defense 
spending remained at Cold War levels…”154 In his novel In the Shadow of War: The 
United States Since the 1930s, author Michael S. Sherry points out: “That it [the war 
metaphor] stuck revealed how political culture remained militarized even as war itself 
seemed to recede.”155 The manichean nature of this American war metaphor and 
rhetoric persisted, even in times of peace. The use of this metaphor, Sherry says: 
 …presumed that Americans found purpose only in war, that their state 
functioned effectively only in a warlike mode, and that the nation knew 
triumph only in warfare…But if there was something good about war, 
why should Americans settle for a substitute—why not the real thing, 
which would mobilize and rejuvenate Americans even more? That was 
the implicit logic of the war metaphor, one that worked powerfully 
because it was unspoken.156 
As the theory of threat inflation, under the title domestic political explanation, asserts, 
initiating the 1991 Gulf War was potentially a reaction from former President Bush Sr.,                                                         
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both in response to growing conflict in the Middle East, as well as the hope that a 
successful war “would guarantee his reelection.”157 Whatever the real motives, the 
United States entered into war following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Former 
President Bush Sr.’s response to this threat is especially important in contextualizing the 
development of manichean rhetoric used to frame future conflicts with terrorist groups 
and the Middle East. After Hussein’s aggression, Bush Sr. received immense support 
from allies abroad in forming a coalition against Iraq. Following in the path of the Cold 
War politicians before him, Bush Sr. said this after the Gulf Crisis began “I would not 
call [the United States] the world’s policeman…But we have a disproportionate 
responsibility for the freedom and the security of various countries.”158 This statement 
is distinctly reminiscent of the “manifest destiny” myth of empire, one of the main 
beliefs which shaped the international policies of the Cold War.  
 Furthermore, the former president asserted that the Iraqi threat in the early 1990s 
was synonymous to the threat of Hitler in the time of WWII. He used words like 
“blitzkreig” to describe Hussein’s war tactics and even said that there had been no other 
threats “of this moral importance since World War II.”159 According to Sherry, “Bush’s 
Hitler analogy was unpersuasive to many Americans,” including members of his own 
administration.160 Again, we see another American president using terminology 
mirroring the great dualistic conflict of WWII, an era which, in combination with 
language used during the Cold War, firmly established a precedent of manichean 
framing of conflict in the American psyche. This time however, the frame was used to                                                         
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describe the threats and conflicts present in the Middle East with a distinctive binary, 
black-and-white morality. 
 With the support of 79 percent of the American public,161 Congress granted 
Bush the right to enter into war.  The United States headed an international coalition, 
initiating what was called “Operation Desert Storm.” On paper, this retaliation 
successfully accomplished its aims, with the exception of Hussein’s survival in power. 
From here on out, however, the U.S. would remain entangled in a series of Middle 
Eastern conflicts, declaring as a result a new policy of “containment.” According to 
Andrew J. Bacevich’s book, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are 
Seduced By War, “A contingent of approximately twenty-five thousand U.S. troops 
remained after Desert Storm as a Persian Gulf constabulary…”162 As a result Bacevich 
says, “What U.S. policymakers called containment was really an open-ended quasi-
war.”163 Thus, U.S. presence in the Middle East led to exactly what former President 
Bush said he did not see as America’s international role—that of a policeman abroad.  
 After the apparent success of Operation Desert Storm, as noted by journalist and 
former White House Aide Sidney Blumenthal, “his [G.W.H. Bush] popularity rating hit 
ninety percent, the highest ever recorded for a President.”164 The general public was 
incredibly happy with the results, with one columnist saying U.S. troops “fought for the 
just and moral cause of freeing the enslaved, brutalized people of a helpless country.” 
The New York Times too said, “It is as if all the confusion and pain of recent decades                                                         
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have melted, leaving the nation with its reassuring images from World War II intact.”165 
Again, the invocation of World War II and the general view that the U.S. had been a 
savior against totalitarian regimes was reinforced by its successes in the Middle East. 
This unification would prove only temporary, however, and the first Bush left office 
handing off a series of difficult situations abroad to the next President, Bill Clinton. 
 With Clinton in office, the containment policy established by G.W.H. Bush 
remained largely intact, and at times even more militant. Bacevich says that in fact 
during the last 2 years of Clinton’s term, “the United States bombed Iraq on almost a 
daily basis, a campaign largely ignored by the media and thus aptly dubbed by one 
observer “Operation Desert Yawn.””166 Throughout the next few years, Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq faced a series of investigations by the UN into claims of possessing 
nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and biological weapons. According to 
Chaim Kaufman, Hussein’s post-war behavior reflected that he could be deterred, as 
evidenced he says by Hussein’s acquiescence to the destruction of his nuclear weapons 
programs and his eventual halt of biological and chemical weapons programs. Kaufman 
says, “Iraq cooperated with intrusive inspections to a degree rarely seen in a country not 
militarily occupied.”167 Kaufman also asserts that: 
 Although Hussein may still have been interested in acquiring nuclear 
weapons, evidence available both inside and outside the U.S. 
government throughout the mid-1990s…showed beyond a reasonable 
doubt that by 2002 Iraq had not had an active nuclear weapons program 
for more than a decade…168 
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Some historians dispute this, arguing that discoveries of biological weaponry and 
testimony from former members of Hussein’s regime prove otherwise. However, 
mounting evidence points to the fact that indeed, Saddam Hussein was more deterrable 
than the administration and press led the general American public to believe, partly as a 
result of President G.W.H. Bush’s own policies and rhetoric and their influence 
throughout the subsequent Clinton administration.  
 Terrorist attacks both on U.S. soil and abroad against American citizens and 
institutions, specifically in the Middle East, continued mostly at the hands of Osama bin 
Laden and his al Qaeda affiliates. U.S. responses to these various attacks were as vague 
as their origins often were. The spottiness of information available to the White House 
is mirrored in attempts to identify a coherent threat and resulting actions of the U.S.. 
During his term, Clinton referred to militant combatants as “the bin Laden network,” 
and Bacevich remarks that another such term commonly used by the administration was 
the use of the “disembodied” term “terrorists.”169 The result was a war, continuing on 
from the earlier Operation Desert Storm, but yet a war in which the U.S. had no single 
target or consistent tactical approach. Ultimately, Bacevich says: “The various episodes 
constituting the war’s major engagements remained inexplicable, unfathomable, and 
seemingly unrelated.”170 Thus, at the end of the decade, the vague threat of terrorism 
against the U.S. continued to loom in very real attacks on the U.S. and its peoples, but 
was often interchangeably linked to Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, the country of 
Iraq and or the Middle East at large. 
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B. Catalyst: The 9/11 Attacks and Declaring the War on Terror 
i. The 9/11 Attacks 
 September 11, 2001 is a day that will remain burned into the memory of the 
American people for decades to come. On that morning, 19 Islamic militants with 
associations to al Qaeda hijacked 4 planes in suicide missions aimed at high-profile 
targets in the U.S.. New York City watched helplessly as two of the airlines flew into 
the World Trade Center and soon after a third plane was flown into the Pentagon. The 
fourth was diverted from its path, crashing into a field in Pennsylvania and killing all 45 
people on board. 
 These attacks, known by the date 9/11, were reportedly carried out in retaliation 
against U.S. military occupation of Middle Eastern states, participation in the earlier 
Persian Gulf War, and American support of Israel. More than 3,000 people died during 
the attacks— over 400 policemen, fireman, and thousands of innocent civilians.171 
Thousands of others were treated for injuries and many people still suffer from long-
term health issues as a result of debris and toxic dust from the affected buildings. The 
attacks were reportedly financed by Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda group, and the 
U.S.’s response to these threats would define the policy and practices of President 
George W. Bush and his administration over the next few years. 
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ii. Analysis of President Bush’s Initial Address 
 In the evening following the devastating 9/11 attacks, President Bush addressed 
the nation at approximately 8:30 p.m. EST via TV broadcast.172 His speech, which 
would set a precedent for politicians, journalists, and the public at large, used a rhetoric 
to describe the attacks in extreme, manichean terms. He begins by saying, “Today our 
fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of 
deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.”173 Similar to the speeches by Truman and Churchill 
analyzed in Part 1, the President asserts that American values, along with the targeted 
American people, are being threatened. He continues on to describe the attacks as “evil, 
despicable acts of terror.”174 He uses the term “evil” in fact four separate times 
throughout his short speech to describe the events, the last of which is a part a quote 
from Psalm 23, “The Lord is My Shepherd,” which says: “Even though I walk through 
the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me.” The invocation 
of God and the specific use of Christian values against the evil of the attacks once again 
frames the situation as a clear-cut, dualistic moral dilemma. 
 Furthermore, in explaining the reasons for the sudden strike Bush states: 
“America was targeted for attack because we are the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.”175 The imagery 
of “brightest beacon” and “light” contrasts against the unspoken implication and 
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archetypal framing of threats and “evil” as dark contrasting with the luminosity of all 
that is good. After setting up this manichean, black-and-white explanation of the events, 
halfway through the speech President Bush states the priorities of the state as he sees 
it:“Our first priority is to get help for those who have been injured, and to take every 
precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.” 
He later says:“America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace 
and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”176 
 Besides the clear establishment of a narrative which frames the situation at hand 
in extreme manichean terms, there are a few aspects of this speech which make them 
worth noting. For one, although the attacks occurred domestically, the President 
includes protection for those abroad next to the number one priority of protecting U.S. 
citizens in his list of priorities following the events. In light of the fact that Islamic 
militants made the attacks—outsiders seeking gains for their own aims abroad—it 
appears hypocritical that the response from Bush would list protecting non-Americans 
abroad from similar attacks.,attacks which reportedly were in retaliation for U.S. 
intervention abroad. Furthermore, by framing the 9/11 attacks in the context of the 
bigger picture of international peace and security, President Bush turns the conflict into 
something much more widespread than the reality. This reality, which already sent the 
nation into crisis-mode, contributed to the establishment of a national narrative in which 
the U.S. was cast as the blameless hero defending the world against evils. Bush’s 
framing of the conflict, with its characteristics of threat inflation and rhetoric, are all 
uncannily similar to the language and aims of Cold War politicians seeking to mobilize                                                         
176Gerhard and Woolley, "George W. Bush.” 
  
63  
the general public into militant conflict by playing up the fears surrounding a single 
incident, turning it into a manichean battle in which violence is wholly inevitable. For 
example, the Tonkin Gulf incident that propelled us into the war in Vietnam. Thus, by 
interpreting the 9/11 attacks as an event which forced the U.S. to respond to violence 
with violence against an irreconcilable, evil enemy, President Bush successfully set the 
stage for future conflict by interpreting a very complex, devastating event into a neat us-
versus-them framework which would support later offensive initiatives abroad. 
iii. Declaring the War on Terror 
 On September 14th, a mere 3 days after the attacks, Congress authorized 
President Bush to ““to use all necessary and appropriate force” against the perpetrators 
of the Sept. 11 attacks, their sponsors, and those who protected them.”177 The resolution 
passed with overwhelming majorities of 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House. 
Then, on September 20th, President Bush affirmed the “War on Terror” and its 
narrative frame through a speech to a joint session of Congress and the entire U.S. in 
which he outlined his war aims. His speech, which he compares to a State-of-the-Union 
address despite the unusual timing, is organized in such a deliberate-seeming way that 
even a Time magazine article published just after it was given called it: ‘The Bush 
Speech: How to Rally a Nation.” In this article, author Frank Pelligrini breaks the 
speech down into 5 main organizational categories based on a list of semi-rhetorical 
questions Bush himself poses at various points throughout the speech: “Step One: 
Explain it all….Two: Distinguish, for the sake of not only peace at home but diplomacy 
abroad, between the faith and the men….Three: Get down to brass tacks….Four: Give                                                         
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the marching orders….Five: Rise to the occasion.”178 Following in the footsteps of this 
article and the framework laid out by Pelligrini, this next section will describe elements 
of Bush’s argument for a “War on Terror” and how it contributed to the establishment 
of a continuing manichean narrative and the mobilization of a nation. 
 The first step, according to Pelligrini, is: “Explain it all,” leading with the quote, 
“Americans are asking, “Who attacked our country?''179  Bush begins immediately by 
invoking the will of the American public. He says: “…in the normal course of events, 
presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the union. Tonight, no such 
report is needed; it has already been delivered by the American people.”180 By speaking 
for the public at large Bush successfully creates a foundation sanctioned, as he says, by 
his constituents, for the rest of his intentions in response to the attacks. Indeed, polls 
taken immediately after the attacks asking the American public about their views on 
launching into war were as “high as 74 percent supporting this in November” of 
2001.181 
 Another successful tactic is rather than casting the U.S. as the aggressor 
initiating a war, he declares, “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an 
act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years 
they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941…” He reinforces 
the immediacy of the situation by restating the fact that the attacks occurred on 
American soil and by likening the attack to Pearl Harbor, he establishes a connection                                                         
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between the two. Notably, he links 9/11 to the single event which mobilized public 
sentiment and ultimately pushed the U.S. into the war. In referring to Pearl Harbor he 
frames it as a precedent for sending the U.S. into war, an event similar to the catalyst of 
the recent 9/11 events. By connecting the two events Bush further sets the stage for the 
launching of a defensive, preventive war based on past events and the urgency of the 
situation. 
 Next, Bush is able to establish a more tangible identity for the “collection of 
loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.” He connects them with 
past terrorist attacks and substantiates the threat of the organization further by 
analogizing al Qaeda to the Mafia—again creating a familiar connection in the minds of 
Americans. In this way he is able to establish a coherent threat out of a very inconsistent 
enemy. As Pelligrini says:  
Then he set about replacing a shadowy, stateless organization with 
something Americans are more used to dealing with: the villainous 
leadership of a country, a leadership we can despise, a Milosevic, a 
Saddam. Someone we can threaten — and if necessary, punish — before 
frustration sets in.182 
After establishing a tangible threat linked with historically familiar enemies, Bush then 
defines them in even more concrete terms. as Afghanistan and the Taliban. He says, 
“These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. They will hand over the 
terrorists, or they will share in their fate.”183 By naming the Taliban and Afghanistan as 
the ones responsible for responding to the 9/11 attacks, Bush effectively identifies them 
as the enemies. 
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 The second step, according to Pelligrini, is to “Distinguish, for the sake of not 
only peace at home but diplomacy abroad, between the faith and the men.”184 Like his 
initial 9/11 address, Bush seeks to outline the conflict as a broader, manichean issue 
between good and evil worldwide rather than stick to the particulars. He appeals to 
Muslims by saying that these extremists are perverting “the peaceful teachings of 
Islam,” in a brief appeal to dissuade prejudices at home from flaring up against Muslim 
U.S. citizens and a nod to allies abroad. 
 Interestingly enough, he once again states the incoherency of the terrorist threat 
by reminding us of bin Laden’s links to organizations in over 60 countries. He declares: 
“It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.” The vagueness and unrealistic extent of this statement cannot be overlooked. 
Then, Bush puts the terrorist threat in a historical framework, comparing it to Nazism 
and totalitarian regimes of the past. He puts this conflict in the perspective of the evil 
despots who ran these regimes. He also likens them to the historical wars that were won 
over long periods of time—once again setting the foundations for a war that, like the 
familiar ones of the past, won’t be won easily. 
 The third step Pellegrini writes is “Get down to brass tacks,” leading with the 
question: “‘How will we fight and win this war?’”185Again, the hypocritical elements 
appear in the speech as Bush describes the government tools that will be used to defeat 
the terrorist threat: “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon 
of war.” Using “diplomacy” on the same playing field as “every necessary weapon of                                                         
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war” is counterintuitive. Rather than exhaust peaceful means of negotiation, Bush’s 
speech goes immediately to the extreme of fighting violence with violence, making the 
first part of his statement seem like a pretense. He continues to warn the American 
people of the consequences of this war, but in a way that does not ask or recommend, 
but rather in a way that tells the public of the inevitable loss of life, time, and financial 
investment:  
Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a 
decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look 
like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops 
were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response 
involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans 
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we 
have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert 
operations secret even in success. 
The above quotation, similar to his 9/11 address and other aspects of his speech, once 
again leaves no middle ground and no alternative to war. The ultimate illustration of 
this extreme dualistic frame is reflected in this statement: “Every nation in every region 
now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Bush 
then announces the creation of a cabinet-level position head of the Office of Homeland 
Security. This is, as Pelligrini puts it, “some concrete news, a visible, tangible step, a 
man we can turn to and Bush can delegate to.”186 This is one example of the tendencies 
of this speech to provide brief, seemingly concrete historical links and tangible 
responses to a vague and abstract threat. 
 Step four leads with Americans asking the question, “‘What is expected of 
us?’”187 His very first response is this: “I ask you to live your lives and hug your 
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children.”188 He then continues to give a variety of answers, most of which follow long 
the lines of: live up to American values, pray for survivors and law enforcement, and 
especially don’t stop supporting the economy. His statements ask for patience and 
comfort for those defending the nation as well as those most vulnerable. He 
acknowledges the increased security measures that the nation will face as a result of the 
attacks, giving tangible responses to these threats like: “We will come together to 
improve air safety, dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights 
and take new measures to prevent hijacking.”189 Still, many of these statements are 
vague, especially when it comes to the war itself, simply calling for patience and 
“Prayer,” which Bush says “has comforted us in sorrow and will help strengthen us for 
the journey ahead.”190 As Pelligrini says: “This is the call of the president beginning a 
mysterious war. Be very, very patient.” 
 Pellegrini’s final and fifth organizational step of this speech is Bush’s call to 
“Rise to the occasion.”191 Again, Bush lauds the role of America in this conflict saying: 
“Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and 
anger we have found our mission and our moment.”192 The magnitude of this proposed 
“mission” is global, and again the US. is cast in terms of international policeman and 
savior of freedom—protection from, as Bush stated earlier, the loosely-affiliated 
terrorist threat. In so many instances at the close of this speech does Bush frame the 
recent and ensuing conflicts in broad manichean terms. In one instance, he combines the 
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dualistic morality of the universal conflicts between good and evil, the conflict at hand, 
and Christian morality in one encompassing statement: “The course of this conflict is 
not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have 
always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.” He then 
continues on to say, “Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice, assured of 
the rightness of our cause and confident of the victories to come.”193 The irony of 
meeting “violence with patient justice” after this speech deliberately declares war on a 
variety of loosely linked threats and asserting that “Americans should not expect one 
battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen”194 is an obvious 
contradiction. Furthermore, the invocation of “the rightness of our cause” reflects the 
myth of empire of manifest destiny, a myth which has strong ties to American 
individualism and has historically been a reasoning behind imperial expansion.  
 Altogether, although this was one of the earliest speeches advocating for a “War 
on Terror,” the rhetoric used established the idea of preventive war as a crucial response 
to the 9/11 attacks. As written in Cramer and Thrall’s American Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11: 
Within days, Bush and his advisers consistently portrayed the attacks as 
the latest stage in a terrorist “war” on “America” and its “values.” 
Deploying a series of binaries, they contrasted the goodness and virtue of 
America with the “evil” of her terrorist adversaries, the freedom that 
Americans prized with the despotism that her enemies represented, the 
victims’ commitment to civilization with the “evildoer” perpetrators’ 
barbarism. “Evil” could not be negotiated or reasoned with, violence had 
to be met with violence, and a “war on terror” was proclaimed.195 
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The invocation of the will of the American people and the justness of their cause, the 
declaration of conflict in universal manichean terms “did not reflect a sober 
appreciation of the American predicament, but instead echoed point by point the 
disastrous strategic ideas of those earlier keepers of imperial order.”196 Those early 
imperial orders strongly resemble the justifications behind U.S. Cold War policy. 
  In no way does Bush admit to foreign policy faults for causing the attacks. In 
fact, “The United States was thus cast as a victim, blameless for the perpetrated outrage: 
the horrific attacks were not a response to its deeds and misdeeds abroad,” and rather he 
9/11 attacks were seen “as a backlash against globalization, as rooted in popular 
frustration with repressive government at home, and as a part of an intra-Arab and 
Muslim civil war.”197  As a result, this unexpected attack facing a newly won 
administration needed a perpetrator to whom justice would be served, and as a result 
“US elites unsurprisingly fell back on older tropes.”198 These tropes, rooted Cold War 
rhetoric, consist of ideas such as manifest destiny, offensive advantage, big stick 
diplomacy, and no trade-offs, all of which can seen in the aforementioned statements 
and rhetoric of Bush’s address to Congress just over a week after the 9/11 attacks. Thus: 
“At the core of these contending accounts lay a common narrative element: “we” were 
attacked because of “who we are,” not because of “what we have done.”199 The rhetoric 
established by the two speeches described in parts ii and iii would continue to be at the 
center of the developing “War on Terror” narrative and motivating the nation into war 
with Iraq.                                                         
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II. Constructing the Narrative 
A. Print Press immediately after 9/11 
 Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, news of the events inevitably exploded 
across print media. One of the most common attributes of these print stories were their 
similarities to if not exact quoting of the President’s first national address. A Huffington 
Post article posted in the year 2011, almost exactly 10 years after the attacks, showcases 
50 headlines the day after 9/11. The following is a list of just 16 of these headlines: New 
York Daily News:“It’s War”; New York Post: “Act of War-World Trade Center 
Destroyed; many dead”; New York Times:“U.S. Attacked: Hijacked jets destroy twin 
towers and hit pentagon in day of terror”; Washington Post: “Terrorists Hijack 4 
Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon, Hundreds Dead”; USA Today: 
“‘Act of War’: Terrorists strike; death toll ‘horrendous’”;  The Miami Herald: “‘Evil 
Acts’: Bush vows revenge for attacks”;  Hartford Courant:“Act of War: with chilling 
precision, terrorists deliver death as America watches helplessly”;  The Seattle Times: 
“TERROR: Trade Center destroyed by hijacked jets”; Richmond Times-
Dispatch:“America’s Darkest Day”; The Cleveland Plain Dealer & the Houston 
Chronicle: “Terror Hits Home”;  The Syracuse Post-Standard: “President Bush-‘Mass 
Murder’: Towers crumble, Pentagon burns, hunt begins; police report cell phone calls 
from rubble”; Detroit Free Press: “America’s Darkest Day: Terrorists will be hunted 
down, Bush tells the nation”; The Honolulu Advertiser: “America’s Bloodiest Day-
‘This is the second Pearl Harbor’”; The Dallas Morning News: War at home; Albany 
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Times Union: “Freedom under Siege”; The Daily Telegraph: “War on America.”200 A 
majority of these headlines use direct quotes from President Bush—namely his 
portrayal of the attacks as “evil” and an “act of war,” specifically a “war on freedom.” 
Freedom, in this case, is synonymous with the United States of America..  
 Bush’s declaration of evil was supported by the use of such phrases as “darkest 
day,” “bloodiest day,” and “mass murder.” Similar to Bush’s September 20 address, 
news outlets likened the attacks to Pearl Harbor, and reinforced the alarming sense of 
fear and urgency with statements like “Terror Hits Home” and “War on America.” 
Newspaper’s adoption of this rhetoric was reinforced by later Bush speeches declaring a 
“War on Terror” and, as polls would show, reflected U.S. public opinion on the 
necessary responses to the attacks. 
 One of the main differences between the 9/11 attacks and the Pearl Harbor 
attacks, however, lie in the definition of the threats at hand. Although as in WWII 
propagandist efforts the 9/11 conflict at large was also defined in terms of duty to 
principles and manichean conflict, there was really a lack of a coherent threat in 2001. 
Pearl Harbor ignited the U.S. entering into a war with major allies against the 
aggressors of Japan, Germany, and other countries as a part of the Axis Powers.  In this 
declaration of war, the enemy was best described as “loosely affiliated” and scattered 
across 60 different countries. Going forward, the establishment of a national narrative to 
frame the War on Terror which could define a tangible and strategic course of action 
became increasingly important to the Bush administration.  
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B. The White House shapes the national narrative 
 One of the key aspects of the years following 9/11 and leading up to the Iraq 
War is the transformation of the national “War on Terror” narrative from that of 
containment of terrorist factions to that of regime change in Iraq, and in particular, the 
evolution of the threat. Though the ‘enemy’ was framed initially as all terrorists 
affiliated with al Qaeda, training cells in Afghanistan, and bin Laden, this definition 
evolved over a short period of time. Through heavy campaigning the Bush 
administration shaped the aims of the War on Terror to identify Saddam Hussein and 
Iraq as targets necessary to declare war upon for a regime change, along with the still-
present threat of al Qaeda and bin Laden.  
 Initially, there was widespread support for entering into war by both the 
American public and Congress. This support is illustrated by the almost unanimous 
passage of war by Congress and the November 2001 Gallup poll in which 74% of 
Americans supported the war. This swell of support for war was short-lived, however. 
Losing traction in public opinion polls, the Bush administration sought to slightly alter 
the established narrative. In order to perpetuate the “War on Terror” narrative and 
motivate public approval of a continued war in the Middle East, the Bush administration 
would need to shape its underlying narrative to provide effective reasoning for war, 
despite sketchy evidence and behind-the-scenes doubts. 
 One of the most significant successes of the millennial Bush Administration in 
swaying public opinion for war was the creation of a direct link between the country of 
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Even though today’s evidence continues in hindsight to cast doubt 
on Hussein’s relationship with al Qaeda and bin Laden, establishing this connection in 
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the minds of the American people was key to getting the public support necessary to 
continue into war in the early 2000s. As early as Bush Sr.’s administration, the use of 
phrases like the “Iraqi regime” invoked an association with “evil.”201 Consistent use of 
the term ‘democratic’ in reference to the U.S. and ‘totalitarian’ in reference to Iraq 
created a dualistic frame for each government, similar to past descriptions of the Soviet 
“regime” in contrast with American “democracy.”  Since Bush Sr.’s analogy of Hussein 
and his regime in Iraq to Hitler’s Third Reich in 1991, this view persisted. Citizen 
polls202 and statements even by Clinton administration officials continued to uphold this 
view. This persisting frame reinforcing the role of terrorist leader and evil dictator 
Hussein would come to play in Bush’s millennial campaign for war in Iraq. The G.W. 
Bush administrations often emphasized links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin 
Laden despite a lack of evidence, reasoning that “their [Hussein and bin Laden’s] 
organizations reflected their leaders’ political programs and personal pathologies, in 
contrast to democracies in which law, not personal whim, ruled.”203 Because acts of 
terrorism, like the 9/11 attacks, eschew the logic of state and even international laws 
which seek to regulate global conflicts, targeted states like the U.S. “consequently 
respond by asserting anew their territorial identity, reimposing a geopolitics of identity 
and difference, and emphasizing the primacy of territorial defense.” Thus, in response 
to both terrorist attacks and declining public support for war, the Bush administration 
shifted the frame of conflict using the already manichean rhetoric historically rooted in 
the minds of everyday Americans and linked to Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
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 After the November 2001 polls, public opinion in favor of war declined “to 
about 50 percent in August 2002…”204 The turning point in this decline coincides with 
the Bush administration’s campaign to remove Saddam Hussein by force, with public 
support reaching 66 percent in March 2003. Between June 2002 and August 2002, the 
percent of Americans “favoring invasion even without UN sanction or allied 
cooperation” rose 25 percent, reaching a high of a total of 55 percent of Americans in 
favor in March of 2003.205 According to Cramer and Thrall, this evolution matched “the 
evolution of the administration’s public positions.”206 An interesting aspect of these 
polls was how they themselves framed questions regarding the war in the post-9/11 
period. “Public opinion surveys over the coming years questioned not whether the 
United States should engage in a War on Terror, but rather how that war might be most 
effectively waged.”207 As a result, as  political scientist Dr. Ian Lustick concludes, “The 
War on Terror has thus achieved the status of a background narrative.””208  
 
C. Broadcast Media picks up the narrative 
 i. Broadcast and the administration 
 It is well known that the media aids in disseminating policy agendas of the elite. 
News outlets report on public policy proposals, political campaign platforms, White 
House announcements, and a variety of other topics related to the agendas of various 
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politicians. One of the most important aspects of the relationship between press 
discussion and policy agenda lies in the very nature of hard news gathering. As Nelson, 
Clawson, and Oxley say: “Journalists’ common reliance on elite sources for quotes, 
insight, analysis, and information means that the media often serve as conduits for 
individuals eager to promote a certain perspective to a broader public audience.”209 
Thus, the use of direct quotations, which oftentimes can themselves be analyses of 
certain topics by political elites, leads to media usage of specific rhetoric surrounding a 
subject. Furthermore, according to an article in the Stanford Journal of International 
Relations, during the Iraq war: “86 percent of viewers received their news about war 
from television and more specifically, 70 percent from cable television.”210 Based on 
the nature of the medium, quotes in various forms including sound bites and video clips, 
are broadcast, making it an effective public policy tool. The next few paragraphs detail 
the transformation of the Bush administration’s campaign to frame the War on Iraq 
from a policy of containment to that of regime change, and describe especially how this 
campaign evolution was picked up by broadcast TV news. 
 Before 2002, U.S. policy towards Iraqi aggression was that of containment. 
Condoleezza Rice believed that Hussein and Iraq could be contained, as she said in the 
2000 presidential campaign:“the first line of defense should be a clear and classical 
statement of deterrence—if they [Iraq] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be 
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unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration”211 In 2001 
Secretary of State Colin Powell also agreed that the containment policy would be 
successful in Iraq.212 In 2002, however, deterrence became impossible, according to the 
Bush administration. That year, Bush declared a National Security Strategy (NSS) 
which favored preventive war and preemptive strikes, saying: “Given the goals of rogue 
states [and] the inability to deter a potential attacker” of this kind, said the document, 
“we cannot let our enemies strike first.”213 This NSS document “sought to redefine 
Hussein as not an ordinary regional despot careful to protect his power, but an evil 
madman bent on the destruction of the United States and willing to run virtually any 
risk to himself or his country to fulfill his goal.”214 The arguments in favor of a 
preventive war by conservative elites were picked up by the media, and thus the 
reinvented frame of the War on Terror was publicized during 2002 and 2003. 
 One of the arguments of the administration was that Saddam Hussein was now 
closer to acquiring WMD than ever. During NBC’s Meet the Press on September 8, 
2002, Vice President Cheney said that Iraq had “reconstituted its nuclear weapons 
program” and that “many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear 
weapons fairly soon. Just how soon, we cannot really gauge.”215 The New York Times, 
also in September of 2002,  reported that “…Bush and other officials contended that 
because Iraq already possessed a design for a nuclear weapon, “with [imported] fissile 
material [it] could build [a bomb] within a year.”216                                                          
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 Although these claims were made by a variety of administration officials, it is 
the omission or release of certain information by these elites that holds major influence 
over media coverage. Both the President and his administration’s wide access to 
intelligence means they have the power to release or omit key pieces of information that 
may be used by media outlets to sway or detract from public support of an issue. Thus, 
they could release statements such as the quote mentioned above in the New York 
Times, yet simultaneously suppress or not release another piece of information. As a 
result, the administration has direct power in influencing the media’s coverage of 
certain aspects of intelligence information and as a result, holds some power over public 
opinion. This occurred throughout the Bush administration, and in particular during the 
2002-2003 campaign for support of the Iraq War. One example of this is cited in 
American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: “For instance, shortly before the 
congressional votes in October 2002 giving President Bush the authority to go to war 
against Iraq, the administration released part of a Special National Intelligence Estimate 
on Iraq to support its claims about nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, but kept 
secret 40 distinct caveats or official dissents.”217 Thus, media portrayal of the Iraq 
conflict was often skewed by the omission of facts and dissents withheld in attempts to 
increase support for the Iraq War. 
ii. Growing conservative bias in broadcast news 
 As previously mentioned, the role of President and the influence of his 
administration often results in a monopoly over media coverage. Regardless of whether 
or not the mainstream media outlets themselves are aligned with the same political                                                         
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ideologies or agendas, the Presidential administration still holds power over media 
programming based on its access to intelligence and its national importance. As a result 
of “ideological fragmentation…even the most egregious administration promoted myths 
will receive support from friendly media,” and even neutral broadcast networks become 
in many ways a mouthpiece for the President and his views.   
 Furthermore, one of the common characteristics of broadcast journalism in the 
1990s and 2000s is the portrayal of typically hard news as soft news. Soft media blurs 
the lines of hard-news reporting and entertainment. Often, these two intersect. In 
Matthew A. Baum’s Soft News Goes to War, he says that characteristics of “soft news” 
include a focus on human-interest pieces and a sensationalized portrayal and emphasis 
on dramatic content, like disaster and crime.218 As a result of the increase in military 
operations during the 1990s and post 9/11 period, the media has begun to use the 
popular framework of human-interest stories in the depiction of foreign crises and 
military operations.219 In American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear, page 352 
describes a “domestic prism,” which influences foreign news. This “domestic prism” 
deals primarily with an emphasis on localizing hard news topics, similar to the 
incorporation of soft news frames into depictions of foreign crises. The idea of 
localizing, of providing hard news in a context more digestible to small-town, soft-
news-loving Americans is one of the founding principles of the notoriously 
conservative Fox News program. 
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 One of the journalistic phenomena of the late 1990s-the 2000s is the “Fox News 
effect,” a phrase coined by researchers at UC Berkeley and Stockholm University. 
These researchers found evidence linking the success of the rising conservative network 
to Bush’s success in the 2000 elections.220 In fact just six years after its founding, in 
2002 Fox News viewership exceeded CNN in the U.S.221 In June of 2004, a survey 
“showed that one in four Americans claimed to “regularly watch” Fox news; higher 
viewership than any over the air or cable network.”222 By spring of 2006, the number of 
Fox Network’s prime time watchers exceeded the viewership of CNN, CNBC, and 
MSNBC combined.223 
 Growing success of the network led to accusations of Republican bias, and 
indeed 52% of all Fox News viewers identified as conservative.224 According to 
Vaughn: “One-third of all Republicans claimed to regularly watch the network while 
only one in four Democrats watched. And only one in four Democrats said they 
believed “all or most” of what they saw on Fox News, the lowest number for any news 
network.”225 The program and the administration had similar perspectives, espousing 
the ideals of militarized patriotism and of the Iraq War. One example of this can be seen 
in the contrast between the more neutral CNN’s coverage of the conflict versus Fox’s 
coverage. What CNN called the “War in Iraq,” Fox called “Operation Iraqi Freedom”—
the same wording used by President Bush and his administration to describe the war. 
Fox’s use of the administration’s language to describe the war attracted criticism from                                                         
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its peers. For example, columnist Clarence Page criticized the network “for embracing 
the language of the Bush administration in its newscasts. It calls suicide bombers 
‘homicide bombers’ and refers to the war to unseat Saddam Hussein as America’s war 
to ‘liberate Iraq.’”226 Viewers and competing networks alike found that Fox News was 
biased towards the Bush Administration and favored the military; however, it remained 
a popular source of news throughout the Iraq War.227  
Although Fox News is the main example of conservative bias in post-9/11 
media, studies have shown that even those networks considered most neutral often 
adopted a conservative tone. One of the possible results of the conservative bias may 
have been increased self-censorship during the war. Cramer and Thrall say: “…during 
the war, numerous reporters signed agreements allowing the military to vet their stories. 
The impact of this on the content of reporting is uncertain.”228 Embedded journalism 
was one crucial component of the Iraq War which influenced media coverage of the 
conflict at home. During this time period, the Pentagon established a network of 
embedded reporters within military operations abroad. These reporters were deemed: "a 
media representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis – perhaps a period of 
weeks or even months.”229 Although the government stated that the role of embedded 
journalists was to maximize extensive coverage of the war, a policy section in an 
unclassified 2003 report asserted; 
Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape 
public perception of the national security environment now and in the 
years ahead. This holds true for the US public, the public in allied                                                         
226Tuosto, "The "Grunt Truth.” 24. 
227Tuosto, "The "Grunt Truth.” 24. 
228Vaughn. Encyclopedia. 113. 
229Tuosto, "The "Grunt Truth.” 21. 
  
82  
countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition, and 
publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of 
us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement.230 
As the Bush administration sought to define themselves through public policy responses 
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, they also sought to establish a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the military and the press. This relationship, they hoped, would 
positively frame military operations abroad and set a precedent for press coverage of 
future conflicts. Indeed in a study cited in an article on “How Arab television coverage 
of the 2003 Iraq war was used and framed on Western international news channels,” it 
was found that: “Embedded reports were more favorable in tone and displayed more 
trust in the military, thus conforming to the intentions of military public relations 
strategy.” One possible reason behind this bias towards the military in U.S. embedded 
reporting may be related to another characteristic of journalistic structure—that of 
editor rewrites.231 Editor of The Los Angeles Times Marjorie Miller spoke to the 
successes and downfalls of embedded journalism, saying: “The embeds were valuable 
as mosaic pieces. But they could only see as far as they could see and it was up to Tracy 
and Tyler [rewrites] to begin the process of putting some of those little pieces of the 
puzzle into perspective.”232 The result is another layer of filtering, diluting first-hand 
information and rewrites which may not convey content as accurately as possible. 
 In line with the theory of the “domestic prism” and humanistic soft news 
portrayals, the study found that embedded reports consisted of “episodic framing,” 
meaning: 
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 …they focused more heavily on individual cases and occurrences than 
non-embedded news stories. This is particularly relevant because 
episodic framing leads television viewers to attribute responsibility to 
individuals rather than society as a whole or structural conditions…233  
As a result, this fragmented, often biased view of the war by broadcast TV reports 
reinforced presidential claims and the framework of the threat. 
 Additionally, the issue of self-censorship as it relates to embedded journalists 
arises. Tuosto explains:  
…the bias inherent in an embed’s inability to see the larger picture of 
war contributes to a stratified filter of information that exemplifies the 
limitations inherent not only in the biases explored here, but in the 
restrictions placed on embeds as well. Despite necessary militaristic 
regulations, journalists wary of audience and public opinion practice 
self-censorship.234 
 
Embedded reporters are biased based on their inability to get all the facts due to military 
secrecy, as well as their inability oftentimes to place individual coverage in the context 
of the bigger picture. Thus, unintentional biases of embedded reporters based on the 
limitations imposed by the military, editors and their inherently fragmented view of the 
war at large all contribute to various forms of self-censorship which prevent the 
American public’s full access to information.  
 Limited access to information and self-censorship also relates to aspects of the 
American public and their preference for soft news over hard news. In Wessler and 
Adolphson’s study Contra-flow from the Arab world?, they report for example that Fox 
News, unlike some of its Western network competitors, framed a majority of their 
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reports in a slant favorable to the U.S. military and the Bush administration.235 A 
distinct caveat to this finding, however, lies in the main differences between the aspects 
of war that American outlets cover versus foreign outlets. Evidenced in an article by 
Aday et al., for American audiences “in particular, the portrait of war offered by the 
networks was a sanitized one free of bloodshed, dissent, and diplomacy but full of 
exciting weaponry, splashy graphics, and heroic soldiers.”236 The proliferation of soft 
news frames used to describe military conflict reinforces this finding.  
 Growing conservative bias in news media of the early 2000s influenced and was 
mutually affected by the Republican Bush administration. Additionally, some evidence 
points to the hierarchal structure of broadcast networks and journalistic methods of 
gathering news affecting the credibility and objectivity of reporting during the Iraq War. 
Networks run by private owners are subject to their desires and biases, which in turn 
creates biases in reported subjects and journalistic methods. These and other practices 
by news outlets mirrored conservative networks like Fox news through their self-
censorship and reinforcement of the manichean rhetoric of the Bush administration.  
 The successful effects of this administration’s campaign to frame the Iraq War 
as one which was necessary to prevent Saddam Hussein from deploying WMD against 
the U.S. and linking his regime to the 9/11 attacks can be illustrated by Gallup poll 
results in 2002 and 2003. In late 2002, “70-90 percent of the American public believed 
that Hussein would sooner or later attack the United States with weapons of mass 
destruction” (Gallup, 13-16 Sept and 10-12 Dec 2002). In August 2002, “Between 45 
percent and 66 percent also believed that he had assisted the September 11 attackers.”                                                         
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(Gallup, 19-21 Aug 2002). Furthermore, in polls taken by Fox News in 2002 and CNN 
in 2003, “69 percent believed that Iraq already had nuclear weapons, and in another, 80 
percent thought this likely.”237 Americans supported key arguments to go to war with 
Hussein and Iraq, arguments which were exaggerated interpretations portrayed by Bush 
administration members and the media as fact. 
 
D. The Marketplace of Ideas 
 The Bush administration’s success in convincing both elites and the public to 
engage in a war which was founded upon shaky evidence and decades of pre-
established rhetoric were compounded by the absence of dissent from a majority of 
Democrats and the news media. American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear 
reports the results of a study on network TV coverage of Iraq during a period of two 
weeks early in 2003, which found that: 
…more than half of the 393 sources quoted were U.S. officials. Only 17 
percent of sources quoted expressed skepticism about administration 
policy, most of whom were Iraqi or other foreign government officials. 
Only 4 percent were skeptical expressions by Americans, and only half 
of these had any affiliation to advocacy or expert organizations (FAIR 
2003). 
There are countless arguments as to why there was such a lack of dissenting 
ideas during the period leading up to the war with Iraq.  The next few paragraphs 
discuss some of these arguments, all related to the weaknesses of the news media as 
discussed in the previous section. 
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One of the main arguments which aligns with persistence of manichean rhetoric 
in both the media and discussion by elites is that of “rhetorical coercion.”238 In this case, 
rhetorical coercion means the absence of socially and politically sustainable discussion 
against the Iraq War. Bush’s rhetoric, which aligned Hussein and his regime with the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, was largely based on the historical characterization of Hussein 
as a leading terrorist and led to a ‘logical’ path to ‘inevitable’ war. This rhetoric and 
narrative effectively barred opposition from Democrats, the media or other contesting 
voices from the discussion because the rhetoric of the time guaranteed that these 
sources not only had weak arguments in the face of the dominant narrative, but would 
also undoubtedly be dealt harsh political and social backlash. Although there was an 
alternative discourse arguing that the U.S. was in fact attacked because of its actions 
“financially and politically assisting repressive regimes, giving Israel unquestioned 
political support and implicitly sanctioning its occupation of Palestinian territory, 
spreading neoliberal economic policies and threatening traditional ways of life,” in 
general public opinion “remained steady between 2001 and 2004 in denying that US 
wrongdoing abroad was primarily responsible for the September 11 attacks.”239  
One of the reasons for this Ronald R. Krebs says, in opposition to Chaim 
Kaufman’s claim that rhetorical coercion occurred largely because of the presidency’s 
dominant access to the media, was the deep psychological effect of the 9/11 attacks on 
the American psyche.240 As a result of a largely unprecedented attack on home soil, the 
urgent fear felt by Americans caused them to focus “on what was possible, not what                                                         
238Thrall and Cramer, American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear. 127. 
239Thrall and Cramer, American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear. 122. 
240Krebs, Ronald R., and Chaim Kaufmann. "Selling the Market Short? The Marketplace of Ideas and the 
Iraq War." International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 201. doi:10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.196. 
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was probable.”241 Thus, the thought of a nuclear invasion from Iraq was something so 
terrifying to the public that the threat was naturally inflated and plausible in the wake of 
the recent attacks. The sense of crisis and urgency, which can be seen by the rapidly 
occurring decisions and campaigns to mobilize the country for war, prevented 
opposition from taking the time to really analyze and develop effective counter 
evidence. As Krebs says, “They were the victims of successful rhetorical coercion.”242 
As a result, high-profile Democrats “whose national profiles might have bolstered the 
opposition to war,”243 either remained silent or as Krebs said joined the bandwagon of 
war. The result was a trend of unifying “behind the executive branch during this 
uncertain period that could be perceived as a period of crisis (although they [elites] 
recognized this crisis did not emanate from Iraq).”244 
 The reasoning behind this bandwagon and silencing effect is arguably similar to 
the reasons why media also failed to ask the hard-hitting questions in the discussion 
leading up to the Iraq War. Ultimately, it comes down to social sustainability and 
individual success. For Democrats and other dissenting politicians, vocal opposition 
may well have severely damaged their reputations. With the possibility of damaging 
their careers in the minds of their constituents, it is no wonder a majority of major 
politicians remained neutral or joined in the Bush administration’s war cries. Similarly, 
the successes of broadcast networks depend largely on ratings and follow the lead of 
their superiors. When the success or failure media institutions, like Fox News for 
example, hinges largely on popularity translated into viewership or the demands of a                                                         
241Krebs and Kaufmann, "Selling the Market Short?” 201. 
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corporate leader, the likelihood that they will aggressively challenge the status quo is 
slim. Combined with the gravity and devastation of the 9/11 attacks and their effects on 
the American psyche, it is understandable that hard counter-arguments would be largely 
omitted from media coverage. 
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Chapter 3: Conclusions 
 Based on my research on this thesis, it is hard not to believe that the U.S. 
marketplace of ideas is ineffective. It was easy to find opinions that support my claims; 
however, I think it is important to note that specifically in regards to the conclusions 
drawn on the media and its role as watchdog may indeed be too specific to the period 
rather than a status-report of the American marketplace of ideas as it operates today. 
The psychological effects of certain contextual events during each studied time period 
cannot be overlooked. Although it is largely agreed that threat inflation occurred during 
both the Cold War and the Iraq War, the events leading up to each are uniquely 
important. The mixture of relief and intense fear of nuclear attack coming out of WWII 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as well as the horror of the 9/11 attacks at home were 
felt strongly by the American people during each time. Thus, genuine public sentiments 
of extreme fear undoubtedly played a reciprocal role in the threat inflation and framing 
of conflict that was depicted by elites and the media. That being said, I affirm that in 
these different time periods, although the threats were unique, the number of parallels 
between reactions and coverage from the government and journalists are too frequent to 
be overlooked as coincidence. In effect, the fact that two very damning histories 
repeated themselves in the U.S. in such similar ways demands analysis and attention in 
order to illuminate and hopefully correct for the future the failure of the marketplace of 
ideas in both eras. 
 One of the issues that must be addressed is that in both time periods, a large 
reason behind the incredible threat inflation was due to the portrayal of interpretations 
made by administration members as facts. Regardless of whether or not there was 
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absolute evidence to support claims that the Soviet Union or Iraq were constantly on the 
verge of launching a nuclear attack, elites interpreted information which was usually 
only partially released to the public. Thus, the threat interpretations based on 
government intelligence were portrayed as fact by the media. Whether information was 
limited to the public for security reasons or for agenda-setting, in both the Cold War and 
the post 9/11 era the press was simply not given the full picture, and thus had only the 
intelligence provided by elites to analyze and criticize. 
 Although the immediate post-WWII international community was more than 
ever connected by radio and communication between countries had increased, there 
remained a lack of reliable or mainstream news outlets, which voiced differing, credible 
international opinions. Following WWII, state-run communications outlets were 
suspicious to some as they retained the stigma of being associated with propaganda. 
Print and broadcast networks too had restrictions as a result of private ownership and 
the need for commercial sponsors. U.S. involvement in the World Wars coupled with 
successful fear-based propaganda efforts which swayed public opinion towards a 
newfound policy of prevention by intervention created many obstacles for the press. 
Popular media (books, radio, film) continued to provide moral and cultural 
reinforcement of American ‘traditions’ in the face of the enemy, who was defined by 
extreme contrast and juxtaposition to U.S. culture and ideals, even after the close of the 
second World War. Manichean rhetoric used by key politicians, such as Churchill and 
Truman, was used to frame the Communist threat as ‘evil’ and Americans as a ‘savior.’ 
This language was picked up and expanded upon by U.S. news sources nationwide, in 
print, radio and early TV broadcasts. Although American journalists were less limited 
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by government regulation than many other nations, self-censorship was largely imposed 
to prevent government and public retaliation. The fear of retaliation in the form of 
financial penalties, content restrictions, and public disapproval all contributed the 
imposition of self-censorship.  
 And yet, many of these things can also be said of the portrayal of information 
surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The repetition of myths of empire and other rhetorical 
tropes founded in the Cold War throughout the Bush administration resulted in [a 
repetition of Cold War rhetorical coercion:  “A cultural domestic environment 
established in an earlier period in response to a different international environment 
embodied a set of norms that later constrained the behavior of rational political 
actors.”245 Picking up on the rhetoric used by Bush to describe terrorists, notably the 
evil they embody compared to the strength of American resolve, U.S. TV news 
broadcasts and print media often reinforced this dualistic framework in their language 
and interpretations. Many of the reasons for self-censorship during the early 2000s were 
the same as during the Cold War. According to Stephen L. Vaughn’s Encyclopedia of 
American Journalism, Bush’s agreed-upon terrorist frame effectively served to prevent 
“explicit criticism out of concern for damaging public morale or fear of a public 
backlash,” which “left little room for democratic deliberation and debate.” Although 
there was in fact a large number of vocal anti-war elites, the U.S. engaged in a war, 
which in hindsight the majority now sees as hugely flawed. Thus, rhetorical coercion 
was one aspect in both time periods which prevented the proliferation of dissent in the 
media or from elites.                                                         
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 The main difference between the immense impacts of these media frames on the 
American public in each individual era, however, is that post-9/11 newsmakers had the 
advantage of pulling withheld American government information from external 
international news sources. BBC, Al Jazeera, and others provided alternate footage and 
coverage of events occurring in Afghanistan, giving the American public much-needed 
opposing viewpoints. The persistent negative framing of Al Jazeera in many American 
broadcasts, for example, reflects a lack of unbiased framing of Middle Eastern news 
sources as viable alternative outlets. However, Al Jazeera’s integration into domestic 
platforms reveals one of the most important aspects of the shifting field of journalism in 
the U.S.: an evolving global and democratic media landscape. 
 Furthermore, fear of the ‘other,’ namely that abstract enemy ‘terrorism,’ was not 
nearly as long lasting as the fear of Communism was in the early 1950s. One reason for 
this was American citizens no longer had to rely solely on information preselected and 
neatly framed to promulgate the aims and agenda of the federal government, as they 
often did in the early years of the Cold War. Although there were opposing viewpoints 
discussed in both American and foreign media and elites, the Bush’s war agenda won 
out and this criticisms were obsolesced for the time being.   
 Based on the evidence presented in this thesis I argue that one of the major 
issues at play here is the historical bias of the majority of American news outlets 
towards their own successes. The Director of Project Censored, an extensive survey on 
American media published in 1997, reported that significant stories were ignored 
because of “media self-censorship rather than governmental restraints.”246 This self-                                                        
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censorship was enacted to protect “the media’s bottom line” as these stories “are 
contrary in some way to the financial interests of publishers, owners, stockholders or 
advertisers.”247  
 As a result, when news agencies espouse the aims of their own popularity and 
profits over living up to the standards of the fourth estate, the consequences are felt by 
the American people. During the Cold War and the post 9/11 years, print and broadcast 
journalism frequently fell victim to the agendas of the elite. These elites could be media 
conglomerate CEOs, editors seeking to increase ratings or viewership, or the U.S. 
President himself seeking public support to engage in war. These powers more often 
than not dictated content and the framing of information during both the Cold War and 
the post 9/11 era. This is not a problem in which a single person or factor is to blame, 
but rather it is an issue stemming from the structure of the industry itself.  
 In a country whose culture has so vehemently espoused proud ideals of 
independence, individualism and freedom, the ability of the press to serve the public 
without bias is sometimes impeded by the system within which it operates. This system, 
which thrives on the power of the majority and rewards the financially successful, does 
not match up with the historical definition of journalism as the fourth estate, especially 
when faced with external threats, like Communism and terrorism, which expose the 
nation’s vulnerabilities. In a lecture given by Dr. Hugo Slim on Terrorism in the Age of 
Human Rights, he explained terrorism as an action meant to trigger a reaction—a way 
for the opposition to expose the target’s vulnerability leave it with only two, binary 
choices: retaliate or remain idle. The underlying goal, Slim says, is to draw the target to                                                         
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retaliate and ultimately self-destruct, as these adversarial factions continue to exploit the 
target’s vulnerabilities. Based on the evidence presented, I believe that one of the major, 
longtime vulnerabilities of the U.S. is the belief in American cultural and military 
superiority. Quoted in Bacevich’s book is historian, political commentator and leading 
neoconservative Robert Kagan, who delves into this mindset asking: 
If the United States is founded on universal principles, how can 
Americans practice amoral indifference when those principles are under 
siege around the world? And if they do profess indifference, how can 
they manage to avoid the implication that their principles are not, in fact, 
universal?248 
Bacevich responds saying that the answer to these questions, according to Kagan and 
his neoconservative peers, is this: “indifference to the violation of American ideals 
abroad was not simply wrong; it was un-American.”249 Media too often becomes 
entrenched in beliefs of American superiority, yet it reacts in different ways. Rather 
than give the public a variety of outside resources and insights to arm ourselves with 
education and broaden our scope, journalism has evolved into an institution which more 
often than not reinforces these common themes within American society, without 
providing enough outside viewpoints from which we may evaluate ourselves. 
 Drawing parallels in different media forms between the two time eras reflects 
persisting tropes in the American psyche and political rhetoric. Its persistence is clear, 
however the way Americans interpret and digest these persisting tropes changes from 
situation to situation. Despite the changing political climates and public skepticism, 
manichean rhetoric persists amongst the media and elites. Threat inflation and 
identifying the enemy as “evil” worked in the Cold War, as well as immediately post-                                                        
248Bacevich, The New American Militarism. 87. 
249Bacevich, The New American Militarism. 87. 
  
95  
9/11. In the years leading up to the Iraq War, however, there was more skepticism about 
the claims made by the Bush administration. Despite this increase in questioning of 
elites, war was carried out and it was only later that the reality of the threat became 
clear. Do elites continue using this narrative because it has already been established by 
their predecessors, or because they have seen it proven to work? As the party line of the 
U.S. as “good” and enemies as “evil” persists, it seems as though the public is 
somewhat aware of it’s staleness and yet remains fairly apathetic. Minorities begin to 
sway majorities, and the press becomes entangled in the conflict of power when it 
comes to foreign affairs. It is important, for the future function of media as the fourth 
estate, to become aware of these persisting tropes and consciously identify when they 
are justified. Altogether, this research hopes to alert readers of the presence and often 
detriment of manichean rhetoric used by media and elites in the hopes that a better 
informed public will aid in a more beneficial discussion of foreign threats in the 
American marketplace of ideas. 
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